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I.

THE

1988

TERM -

THE REHNQUIST COURT TAKES A RIGHT

TURN IN ITS AFFIRMATIVE ACTION JURISPRUDENCE HEADING IN
THE DIRECTION OF EQUAL ACCESS AND AWAY FROM EQUAL
ACHIEVEMENT

A.

Introduction

The Supreme Court's jurisprudence of voluntary or "benign"
affirmative action has taken a new direction.' Prior to the 1988
Term, the Court had decided nine affirmative action cases; seven
considered the use of race/gender-conscious preferences in employment; one considered their use in public contracting; and one considered their use in a medical school admissions decision.2 In four of
these cases, the Court tested the constitutionality of the challenged
program under the Equal Protection Clause of either the Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendment. 3 In five of these cases, it ruled on their le1. Comprehensively defined, "affirmative action" includes a variety of activities aimed at
"overcom[ing] the effects of past or present practices, policies, or other barriers to equal employment opportunit[ies]." EEOC Guidelines, Affirmative Action Appropriate Under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 As Amended, 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1(c) (1990); see also Office of
Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP), Affirmative Action Programs, 41 C.F.R.
§§ 60-2.1-2.32 (1990). Encompassed within this definition are training plans, recruitment efforts, elimination of any adverse impact caused by selective criteria not validated pursuant to
EEOC Guidelines, and the restructuring of promotion and lay-off procedures.
This article employs the term "affirmative action" in a more restrictive sense, however, to
refer specifically to decisions by employers and public contracting officials, giving preferences
in hiring or promotions or the letting of contracts to individuals based on their race, color, or
sex. While it contains references to gender-conscious preferences, the article focuses more on
race-conscious decision-making. Ironically, because of the Court's adoption of the strict scrutiny test in reviewing race-conscious plans (see infra notes 189-237 and accompanying text),
they may be more difficult for the states to adopt than gender-conscious plans. See Associated
Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 813 F.2d 922 (9th Cir.
1987).
2. This article addresses only those cases in which the Court reviewed voluntarily
adopted affirmative action plans. For the sake of completeness, all nine cases are identified
below and a brief description of their facts is given. See Appendix, infra pp. 1128-32. Each
case is characterized in terms of the equal access/equal achievement constructs discussed in
Part I. This article, however, does not analyze the Court's review of race/gender-conscious
plans which the lower courts have imposed following a trial on the merits of the underlying
discrimination claim or in entering a consent judgment. In such cases, the Court has weighed
additional concerns not examined here such as statutory interpretation and the inherent power
of district courts.
3. The Fourteenth Amendment provides: "No state shall ... deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal- protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fifth
Amendment applicable to the federal government contains no similar provision. However, in
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the Court read an equal protection component into
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court's "approach to Fifth Amendment
equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal protection claims under
the Fourteenth Amendment." Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975).
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gality under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.4 .
In none of the cases, however, did the Court ever consider the two
anti-discrimination norms together.
Despite the vast factual and legal differences among the nine
cases, the Court and scholars viewed them in combination as establishing certain overarching principles. These principles favored - or
at least tolerated - the use of race/gender-conscious preferences in
employment-related decisions and in the letting of public contracts.
Distilled to their essence, these principles permitted race/genderconscious preferences if an adequate "factual predicate" rooted in
prior discrimination existed, and the harm to "innocent" employees
or contractors was minimized.5 The doctrinal development of these
principles proceeded torturously over the course of the nine cases. It
was marred by constantly shifting coalitions of Justices and ambiguous, sometimes contradictory pronouncements in a multitude of majority, plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions.6
In three cases decided during the 1988 Term, City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co.,7 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,8 and Martin v. Wilks,9 the Court clarified some of the prior decisions' ambiguity and resolved several outstanding issues.10 In doing so, the Court
evidenced a dramatic shift in its jurisprudence, making it more difficult for employers and public contracting officials to use race/gender-conscious preferences.1 These cases upset the expectations of
4. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 applies to all employers with fifteen or more employees. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982)). The standard it sets is a high one:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. § 703(a) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)).
5. See Infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
6. For a more complete discussion of the unstable character of these decisions, see
Daly, Some Runs, Some Hits, Some Errors - Keeping Score in the Affirmative Action
Ballpark From Weber to Johnson, 30 B.C.L. REv. 1 (1988).
7. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
8. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
9. 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989).
10. See infra notes 162-88 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 181-88 and accompanying text.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol18/iss4/4

4

Daly: Affirmative Action, Equal Access and the Supreme Court's 1988 Ter

1990]

THE REHNQUIST COURT

many scholars who read the most recent of the nine cases as an endorsement of the use of race/gender-conscious preferences.12
This Article evaluates the impact of the three cases. Its central
thesis is that the three cases represent the Rehnquist Court's preference for equal access as the substantive construct of the anti-discrimination norm contained in Title VII and the Equal Protection
Clause. They also represent the Rehnquist Court's corresponding rejection of the alternate, equal achievement construct. 3
Part I lays the foundation for this thesis, giving an overview of
-the equal access/equal achievement debate. Part II traces the
Court's decisions concerning the statistical disparity needed by an
employer or public contracting official as a factual predicate in order
to implement a race/gender-conscious plan. It shows how the Court
initially used its selection of the appropriate statistical baseline to
prefer the equal achievement construct and how the decisions of the
1988 Term marked a rejection of that construct in favor of the equal
access construct. Part III analyzes the Court's selection of the strict
scrutiny standard of review in Equal Protection Clause challenges to
affirmative action plans and, additionally, demonstrates that the selection of such a standard manifests the Court's equal access preferences. Part IV finds further evidence of the Court's preference for
the equal access construct by reference to its decisions encouraging
the intervention of non-minority employees to challenge judiciallyapproved plans containing race/gender-conscious" relief. In conclusion, Part V considers the future of affirmative action in light of the
new decisions. It calls for Congress to exercise its enforcement power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike a more appropriate balance between equal access and equal achievement as
anti-discrimination norms. Such legislation would facilitate more
rapid integration of minorities and women into the economic mainstream of the nation and foster racial and gender harmony in the
workplace. It would also have the advantage of clearly illuminating
12. E.g., Schwartz, The 1986 and 1987 Affirmative Action Cases: It's All Over But the
Shouting, 86 MICH. L. REV. 524 (1987); Selig, Affirmative Action in Employment: The Legacy of a Supreme Court Majority, 63 IND. L. REv. 301 (1987); see also Rutherglen & Ortiz,
Affirmative Action Under the Constitution and Title VII: From Confusion to Convergence, 35
UCLA L. REV. 467 (1987).

13. Part I's discussion of the equal access/equal achievement construct provides a
framework for the subsequent analysis in Parts II and III of the substantive holdings of the
three cases. Part I is not intended to be a comprehensive articulation of the equal access/equal

achievement antimonies. Other writers have ably explored these antimonies in great detail, and
the reader is directed to their work for a full elaboration. See sources cited infra notes 14-15.
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congressional intent in an area of the law where the courts have
rummaged in the dark for too long without guidance from the legislative branch.
B.

The Equal Access/Equal Achievement Debate

In debating the meaning of equality, legal commentators have
suggested two constructs of anti-discrimination laws.14 The first is
that of equal access. At a minimum, the equal access construct acts
as a restraint on government decision-making. This restraint, in the
form of anti-discrimination laws, prohibits the government from using immutable characteristics such as race, color, or sex to deny individuals full participation in the political community.1 5 The explanation for the restraint is straightforward. Because these
characteristics are beyond the individual's control, the government
should neither bestow a benefit nor impose a burden based on their
presence or absence. Many, but not all, of fhe proponents of the
equal access construct would also argue that the government has an
obligation to police private transactions of a public character to insure that these immutable characteristics do not block access to economic opportunity.1 " In their eyes, the government must legislate for
14. Recent examples of the debate include Reynolds, An Equal Opportunity Scorecard,
21 GA. L. REv. 1007 (1987) (equal access); Hooks, Affirmative Action: A Needed Remedy, 21
GA. L. REv. 1043 (1987) (equal achievement). This debate is sometimes expressed in terms of
"marginal equality" and "global equality." See Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirmative
Action and the Elusive Meaning of ConstitutionalEquality, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1729, 1735-39
(1989). Philosophical commentary on the topic is abundant. E.g., R. DWORKIN TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 223-39 (1977); Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. Cm. L.
REV. 235, 236-49 (1971); Rosenfeld, Substantive Equality and Equal Opportunity: A Jurisprudential Appraisal, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1687 (1986) [hereinafter Rosenfeld, Substantive
Equality]; Rosenfeld, Affirmative Action, Justice, and Equalities: A Philosophicaland Constitutional Appraisal, 46 Omo ST. LJ. 845 (1985).
15. R. FULLINWIDER, THE REVERSE DISCRIMINATION CONTROVERSY: A MORAL AND
LEGAL ANALYSIS 93-109 (1980); N. GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY at vii-xxv (1987); see also Friedman, Redefining Equality, Discriminationand Affirmative Action Under Title VII: The Access Principle,65 TEx. L. REV. 41
(1986) (arguing that a modified equal access theory is the best method to achieve the goals of
Title VII); Shoben, Employee Recruitment by Design or Default: Uncertainty Under Title
VII, 47 OHIO ST. LJ. 891 (1986) (analyzing employment discrimination in recruitment policies). See generally Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause,in EQUAUTY AND PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT 84-154 (M. Cohen, T. Nagel & T. Scanlon eds. 1977); O'Fallon, Adjudication and Contested Concepts: The Case of Equal Protection,54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 19 (1979).
16. Compare N. GLAZER, supra note 15, at xii-xiii (arguing against the "active involvement of government ... in employment and education") with J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 275 (1971) (describing a social system in which government "enforces and underwrites
equality of opportunity in economic activities and in the free choice of occupation. This is
achieved by policing the conduct of firms and private associations .... "). See generally Gal-
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the general welfare of the community to prevent immutable characteristics from being used to construct a caste system affecting individuals' livelihood and self-sufficiency. 17 These advocates extend the
obligation of equal access to employers in the private sector as well
as those in the public sector.1 8 At the heart of the equal access construct lies a negative duty not to impede advancement. This construct views minorities and non-minorities as having equal access
when there is no legal or quasi-legal barrier faced by one and not
faced by the other." In short, under the equal access construct, the
government and certain segments of the private sector become the
great equalizers, assuring that no member of society is hobbled in
the race for economic security and advancement.
The second construct is that of equal achievement.20 It demands
that government take a more active role in the distribution of economic benefits within the community. Citing to the continuing, pernicious effects of years of discrimination, proponents of the equal
achievement construct argue that the promise of equal access is illusory.2" Pointing to the failing school systems in many minority communities, deteriorating family structures, the shrinking job market
for unskilled workers and entrenched sexism in vocational and professional training, its proponents demand a forced redistribution of
economic opportunity. 2 In their view, the race for economic security
ston, Equal Opportunity and Liberal Theory, in JUSTICE AND EQUALITY HERE AND Now 89107 (F. Lucash ed. 1986).
17. See generally Rosenfeld, Substantive Equality, supra note 14, at 1687-91 (discussing opportunity as a negative freedom); Westen, The ConceptofEqual Opportunity, 95 ETHIcs 837 (1984-85) (same).
18. J. RAwLS, supra note 16; Westen, supra note 17; see Sunstein, Legal Interference
With PrivatePreferences, 53 U. Ci. L. Rav. 1129, 1154-55 (1986) (arguing that it is proper
for government to act to change private preferences based on race and gender stereotyping
through legislation outlawing discrimination in employment).
19. See R.FULUNWIDER, supra note 15, at 101-04 (defining formal equal opportunity).
20. Cf. J. RAWLS, supra note 16, at 62 (analyzing two theories of justice whereby "[a]ll
social values. . . are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution. . . is to everyone's advantage."); id. at 73 (describing the liberal interpretation of justice as dependent upon
the concept of fair equality of opportunity); L. THUROW, THE ZERO SUM SOCIETY 187-89
(1980) (criticizing equal opportunity on the grounds that discrimination must be practical in
order to equalize past discrimination); Horowitz, The Jurisprudenceof Brown and the Dilemmas of Liberalism, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 599, 608 (1979) (arguing that discrimination
problems cannot be redressed without acknowledging the validity of vindicating group rights as
well as individual rights).
21. See Fallon, To Each According to His Ability from None According to His Race:
The Concept of Merit in the Law of Anti-discrimination,60 B.U.L. REv.815, 816-18 (1980);
Friedman, supra note 15, at 52.
22. See Fallon, supra note 21, at 832-33.
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is rigged unless those who suffer from the legacy of slavery, Jim Crowism, racial discrimination, and sexism are given catch-up points to
compensate for their disadvantage in the competition.23
Proponents of both constructs find solace and support in the
anti-discrimination norm of the Equal Protection Clause and Title
VII. The proponents of the equal access construct look to Justice
Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson: "Our Constitution is colorblind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens ....
The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color ..

"24

In their view, that statement sets the

norm for government and private sector decision-making in employment and contracting. It represents the norm government should establish to regulate private transactions of a public character, such as
employment. Its champion is Professor Bickel, whose oft-quoted observation is a manifesto of the proponents' sensibilities:
[A] racial quota derogates the human dignity and individuality of
all to whom it is applied; it is invidious in principle as well as in
practice. Moreover, it can easily be turned against those it purports
to help. The history of the racial quota is a history of subjugation,
not beneficence. Its evil lies not in its name, but in its effects; a
quota is a divider of society, a creator of castes, and it is all the
worst for its racial base, especially in a society desperately striving
for an equality that will make race irrelevant. 5
The proponents of the equal achievement construct have also
found articulate defenders of their vision in a Supreme Court Justice
and a distinguished professor of constitutional law. Thus, they look
to Justice Blackmun's famous admonition, "[i]n order to get beyond
racism, we must first take account of race.

. .

in order to treat some

persons equally, we must treat them differently," 26 as explaining why
equal access cannot overcome the multiple hurdles society places,
both consciously and subconsciously, in the way of minorities and
women in the market place. They particularly defend race-conscious
preferences as a product of the democratic process. According to
Professor Ely, when the group that controls the decision making process classifies so as to advantage a minority and disadvantage itself,
23.

Thomson, Preferential Hiring,in EQUALITY AND PREFERENTIAL

TREATMENT,

note 15, at 19-39; Segers, Justifying Affirmative Action, in ELUSIVE EQUALITY:
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICA 75-87 (1983).
24.
25.
26.

supra

LIBERALISM.

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975).
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J.).
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the reasons for being unusually suspicious, and, consequently, employing a stringent brand of review, are lacking.
Whites are not going to discriminate against all whites for reasons
of racial prejudice, and neither will they be tempted generally to
underestimate the needs and deserts of whites relative to those, say,
of blacks or to overestimate the costs of devising a more finely
tuned classification system that would extend
to certain whites the
27
advantages they are extending to blacks.

Part of the difficulty with the Court's affirmative action jurisprudence over the past ten years is attributable to its vacillation between the Harlan/Bickel and the Blackmun/Ely points of view. As
the chart in the Appendix suggests, of the nine cases decided between 1978 and 1988, the Court endorsed the equal achievement
construct six times and the equal access construct five times.2" Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,2 illustrates the
Court's vacillation perfectly. In that case, the Court struck down an
admissions program to a state medical school because it denied equal
access to white applicants by setting aside sixteen seats exclusively
for minority applicants.30 Yet it approved the use of race as a "plus"
in admission programs, a mechanism favoring redistribution of educational opportunities and conforming to the construct of equal
achievement.3 1
The cases decided in the 1988 Term, City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 2 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,33 and Martin v.
Wilks, 4 mark the end of the Court's vacillation. Each of the cases
raised, in one fashion or another, the equal access/equal achievement dilemma.3 5 Regardless of the origin of the anti-discrimination
norm, (i.e., Title VII or the Equal Protection Clause) and despite
vastly different legal and factual issues, the Court resolved each of
the three cases in a manner reflecting equal access values rather
than equal achievement values. That it did so under the leadership of
Chief Justice Rehnquist is hardly surprising. In each of the nine
27. J. H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 170 (1980).
28. See Appendix, infra pp. 1128-32.
29.

438 U.S. 265 (1978).

30. Id. at 315-20.
31. Id.
32.
33.
34.
35.

488
109
109
See

U.S. 469 (1989).
S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
S. Ct. 2180 (1989).
infra notes 162-88, 238-53 and accompanying text.
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cases decided prior to the 1988 Term, he voted to strike down the
race/gender-conscious preferences at issue.36 The Chief Justice
stated his view in one of the earlier affirmative action cases to reach
the Court, United Steelworkers v. Weber,37 and he has not departed
from it: "There is perhaps no device more destructive to the notion
of equality than the numerus clausus - the quota. Whether described
as 'benign discrimination' or 'affirmative action,' the racial quota is
nonetheless a creator of castes, a two-edged sword that must demean
one in order to prefer another." 8 A vehement and vocal foe of both
"goals" and "quotas," Chief Justice Rehnquist has vigorously defended the equal access construct.3 In his view, race/gender-conscious preferences are tolerable only to benefit individual, actual vic36. When Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Powell's plurality opinion in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-78 (1986), which struck down the plan before the Court
but suggested approval of limited race-conscious remedies without a formal administrative,
legislative or judicial finding of prior discrimination, speculation abounded that his opposition
to race/gender-conscious preferences was softening. See Little, Race-Conscious Remedies? Affirmativel, NAT'L LU., July 28, 1986, at 13; Thomas, Reagan's Mr. Right; Rehnquist is
Picked for the Court's Top Job, TIME, June 30, 1986, at 24. However, even before the 1988
Term, Professor Choper astutely observed "all indications suggest that Justice Rehnquist
would subsequently disclaim [the] broad language ....
" Choper, Continued Uncertainty as to
the Constitutionality of Remedial Racial Classifications: Identifying the Pieces of the Puzzle,
72 IOWA L. REv. 255, 273 (1987).
37. 443 U.S. 193, 219-55 (1979).
38. Id. at 254 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
39. A great deal of intellectual energy has been spent distinguishing "goals" from "quotas." The debate centers on rigidity and the absence of choice in the decision-maker. Critics
have maintained that a quota is a fixed numerical designation which must be met regardless of
whether the beneficiaries of the affirmative action program are qualified. Defenders, in rebuttal, say that implicit in any quota is the requirement of competency. In their surrebuttal,
critics dispute the defenders' interpretation and claim that even if true, quotas too often result
in the selection of minimally qualified candidates.
In comparison both sides see "goals" as aspirational in character, Le., percentages toward
which personnel managers and government contracting officers should aspire. Critics complain,
however, that while distinct in theory, in practice goals are treated as quotas, which results in
the hiring or promotion of either unqualified or minimally qualified candidates. See generally
R. FULLINWIDER, supra note 15, at 162-80 (discussing various views defining the difference
between "goals" and "quotas" and the divergence between theory and practice); Duncan, The
Future of Affirmative Action: A Jurisprudential/Legal Critique, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
503, 506-09 (1982) (arguing that the distinction between "goals" and "quotas" is not merely
one of semantics, both are viable and necessary for implementing affirmative action programs);
Kilgore, Goals, Quotas, Preferences and Set Asides: An Appropriate Affirmative Action Response to Discrimination?, 19 VAL U.L. REv. 829 (1984-85) (arguing that the mechanisms
used in affirmative action programs benefit persons who did not actually suffer any identifiable
harms and in fact such mechanisms injure innocent parties). City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), contains no hint whatsoever that labeling a race-conscious preference a "goal" or "quota" is constitutionally significant.
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tims of discrimination. 40 Even in such instances, he has urged
caution in their implementation to protect the interests of "innocent"
parties.41
Until the 1988 Term, the Chief Justice had great difficulty persuading a majority of the Court to accept his views. Two critical
events, however, appear to have propelled the Court's jurisprudence
in a new direction under his leadership. The first was the retirement
of Justice Powell.4 Justice Powell recognized the strengths and
weaknesses of both the equal access and equal achievement constructs, casting his vote on a case-by-case basis.43 His successor, Justice Kennedy seems less tolerant of the equal achievement construct
and voted consistently in favor of the equal access construct in the
1988 Term. The second critical event is Justice O'Connor's more
pronounced discomfort with the cost of the equal achievement approach. A frequent opinion-writer in the area of affirmative action,
Justice O'Connor had vacillated between the two constructs." Her
uncertainty ended in the 1988 Term with her assuming a more aggressive, unsympathetic attitude. With these changes, one in personnel and the other in attitude, Chief Justice Rehnquist gained needed
support for equal access as the substantive content of the anti-discrimination norm of Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause.
What is particularly striking about the transformation of the Court's
doctrine is the manner in which it was accomplished. The three decisions thrust the Court's affirmative action jurisprudence in a new direction without overruling a single precedent. On a surface level, one
can read the Court's decisions simply as a tightening up of previously established principles or a refusal to extend precedent. Such a
reading, however, would tell only half the tale, akin to reading Hamlet as nothing more than the story of a son who murders his stepfather. The decisions of the 1988 Term do clarify precedent. But they
also distort it. In combination, these decisions acutely hobble efforts
40. E.g., Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S.
501, 540-45 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers, Int'l Ass'n
v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 500 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
41. E.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 279-84 (1986) (plurality opinion of Powell, J., in which Rehnquist, C.J., joined); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v.
Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 574-75, 578-79 (1984) (opinion of White, J., in which Rehnquist, J.,
joined).
42. See Taylor, Powell Leaves High Court; Took Key Role on Abortion and on Affirmative Action, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1987, at 1, col. 6.

43. See Daly, supra note 6, at 67-72.
44.

See id. at 72-78.
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by employers and public contracting officials to implement race/gender-conscious preferences.
To label these decisions as reflecting the jurisprudence of the
"Rehnquist Court" may strike some readers as presumptuous since
the Chief Justice wrote only the opinion in Martin v. Wilks, " which
involved intervention, an issue of long-standing concern to the Chief
Justice. In City of Richmond and Wards Cove Packing Co. he simply joined the majority opinion. Nevertheless, the label fits. All three
reflect the attitude of the Chief Justice in the previous nine decisions. The only question outstanding is whether they go as far as he
would like them to in limiting affirmative action. Furthermore, the
Chief Justice would certainly have incurred political wrath if he had
written each of the decisions cutting back on affirmative action. Such
opinion-writing might well make it more difficult for the Bush Administration to win Senate approval for a conservative replacement,
especially in the wake of Justice Brennan's retirement," or upon the
retirement of any other member of the present Court. In light of the
Bork debacle 47 and Rehnquist's familiarity with the politics of appointment to the Supreme Court, it is not unfair to speculate that
the Chief Justice is sensitive to such concerns. Moreover, since the
Chief Justice, as a member of the majority in Martin, City of Rich45. 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989).
46. Justice Brennan's resignation at the end of the 1989 Term is certain to have a
profound effect on the Court's affirmative action jurisprudence. Justice Brennan was the champion of the equal achievement construct. From the very first affirmative action case to reach
the Court, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), to the very last, Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 58 U.S.L.W. 5053 (U.S. June 27, 1990), Justice Brennan was the
intellectual lightening rod for the liberal members of the Court. With the exception of Fullilove v. Kluznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), he is the author of every decision in which the Court
rejected a Title VII or Equal Protection Clause challenge to voluntary or court-mandated,
race-conscious programs. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); United
States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986); Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S.
421 (1986); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). In Bakke, he wrote the
seminal opinion for a four Justice plurality, constructing a powerful argument for the application of the intermediate standard of review to government action which benefitted rather than
disadvantaged minorities. For a more complete analysis of Justice Brennan's contributions in
this area, see Daly, supra note 6, at 48-52.
Justice Souter, who replaced Justice Brennan, indicated to the Senate Judiciary Committee that he approved of affirmative action plans for "remedial" purposes. Exerpts from the
Senate Hearings on the Souter Nominations, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1990, at 10, col. 1.
Whether he endorses the equal achievement construct or how broadly he interprets the equal
access construct is not known.
47. Roberts, The Pro-Bork Split, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1987, at A22, col. 1 (city ed.);
Chicago Tribune, Oct. 4, 1987, at C3 (final ed.); L.A. Times, Oct. 5, 1987, at 1, col. 5 (late
ed.); see 133 Cong. Rec. S13707 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1987) (statement of Sen. Exon).
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mond, and Wards Cove Packing Co., was able to select an opinion
writer for the majority whose views would adequately reflect his
own, there was no reason for him to dramatize the shift in the
Court's views even more starkly by writing the majority opinion in
all three cases.
Finally, if any doubt lingers about the genuiness of the new direction of the Rehnquist Court, other non-affirmative action, civil
rights cases decided during the 1988 Term will most certainly dispel,
it." These cases show the same substantive retreat from the positive,
civil rights values embodied in the equal achievement construct.
Moreover, the technique of decision-making manipulating the retreat
is also the same. In none of these significant, non-affirmative action
civil rights cases did the Rehnquist Court ever overrule precedent.
Instead, it ignored the controlling precedent, glossed it with a narrow
reading and placed greater procedural and substantive burdens on
plaintiffs.
II.

THE HIDDEN SIGNIFICANCE OF STATISTICS IN THE EQUAL

ACCESS/EQUAL ACHIEVEMENT DEBATE

A.

The FourteenthAmendment and Title VII: An Unstable
Partnershipin Pursuit of Equality in the Workplace

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides: "No state shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."49 Its sweep is majestic and its
prohibitions extend to all activities undertaken by government including activities as diverse as the operation of the jury system, the
issuance of licenses, and the establishment of residential districts for
zoning purposes. 50 No dispute exists that at a minimum its substantive content embodies the equal access construct. As such, the Four48. E.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989) (stating that racial
harassment relating to conditions of employment is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981);
Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989) (stating that neither states nor
state officials are "persons" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in actions for money
damages); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2261 (1989) (stating that the
administrative limitations period begins to run under Title VII when an employer adopts a
facially neutral change in a seniority system, not when the change first effects an employee).
49. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
50. E.g., Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (holding that a municipality cannot
zone property using racially-restrictive criteria); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)
(holding that a municipality cannot license laundries in a racially discriminatory manner);
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (holding that states cannot exclude blacks
from grand and petit juries).
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teenth Amendment clearly prohibits racial discrimination in public
employment. For obvious political and social reasons it was rarely, if
ever, used to pursue even equal access as a means of combatting the
blatant discrimination which permeated hiring and promotion decisions in both the North and the South prior to the Civil Rights
movement.
With the Civil Rights movement, minorities vigorously invoked
the Equal Protection Clause to attack segregation in public schools
and state-operated places of public accommodation such as amusement parks, beaches, and golf courses.5 1 The Fourteenth Amendment, however, turned out to be a cumbersome weapon to compel
non-discrimination in public employment. Part of its unwieldiness
stemmed from the Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. Davis,5 12 requiring actual purposeful intent to establish an Equal Protection Clause violation.
The difficulty in satisfying this requirement lead almost all victims of discrimination by public employers to rely instead on Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.53 As originally enacted, Title
VII applied only to private employers and was enacted pursuant to
Congress' commerce clause power.5 Congress invoked its commerce
clause power to outlaw private acts of discrimination because in the
infamous Civil Rights Cases, 5 the Court had limited Congress' enforcement authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
to acts of discrimination by the states.5
Distressed by the minimal progress being made in integrating
public employment, Congress .amended Title VII in 1972 to make
51.

E.g., New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958)

(per curiam) (public parks and golf courses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955)
(per curiam) (municipal golf course); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955)

(per curiam) (public beaches and bath houses); Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347
U.S. 971 (1954) (per curiam) (amphitheater in city park); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954) (public schools).
52. 426 U.S. 229, 239-42, 246 (1976).
53.

Generally speaking, discriminatees would elect to file a suit based solely on the

Equal Protection Clause only in instances in which time was of the essence and the need for an
injunction was so great that compliance with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) was impossible. That

provision requires a discriminatee to wait 180 days after filing a charge with the EEOC before
commencing a Title VII action. The plaintiff's imminent layoff typifies the kind of instance in
which a plaintiff would bypass a Title VII claim. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
476 U.S. 267 (1986).
54.

Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352 § 701, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as

amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982)).
55. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
56. Id. at 6.
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public employers subject to its encompassing scheme.5

Consistent

with the Civil Rights Cases, Congress relied upon its Section 5 enforcement authority.5 8 The 1972 amendments to Title VII left no
doubt concerning Congress' endorsement of the equal access con-

struct and its intent to make non-discrimination in hiring and promotion decisions a universally observed principle of the workplace.
The history of the 1972 amendments to the Civil Rights Act of
1964, however, also suggests Congress' awareness and endorsement

of the equal achievement construct. The 1969 Report of the Civil
Rights Commission, which played an instrumental role in the enactment of the 1972 amendments, urged the adoption of goals to

"giv[e] the work force the shape it presently would have were it not
for such past discrimination." 59
Furthermore, Congress specifically rejected amendments limiting the powers of federal agencies and the courts to implement reme-

dies modeled on the equal achievement construct.6

In 1965, Presi-

dent Johnson had issued Executive Order 11,246, containing broad

findings of discrimination in the construction industry.6 1 The order
.57.

H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 US. CODE CONG. &

ADMIN. NEWS 2137, 2139. More Americans work for the states and the federal government
than any other employer. Almost seventeen million workers are regularly employed as civil
servants or political appointees in the public sector. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, US. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1989, at 293, Table 479. As Con-

gress readily perceived in 1972, the labor practices of public sector employers have an enormous impact on the country as a whole.
Congress' decision to extend Title VII to the public sector sprang from three considerations. First, there was an abundance of evidence demonstrating racial bias in employment decisions in both the North and the South despite the prohibitions contained in the equal protection clause. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. Naws 2137, 2152. Second, racially motivated employment decisions had a highly ad-

verse impact on "governmental activities which are most visible to the minority communities
(notably education, law enforcement, and the administration of justice) with the result that the
credibility of the government's claim to represent all the people equally is negated." Id. at
2153. Third, the absence of administrative remedies to resolve discrimination complaints in the
public sector hindered the nation's goals of equal employment opportunity. The expense and
time involved in litigation rendered constitutional redress "an empty promise" for disadvantaged individuals. Id.

58. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(0, 86 Stat.
103 (1972) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 2000e(f) (1982)).
59. H.R. REP. No. 1746, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE
SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92D CONG, 2D SEss., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, at 1120 (Comm. Print 1972) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]; see id. at 197-98, 1167-68, 1173.

60. Id. at 1167-68.
61. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965), reprinted as amended in 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). See generally 2 C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 547-60 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the contents of Executive Order No.
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required federal contractors to establish race/gender-conscious employment "goals." The federal government exerted enormous pressure on contractors to speed up the hiring and promotions of minorities and women, and lower courts vigorously enforced the order. 62
The absence of intentional discriminatory conduct on the contractors' part was irrelevant to their obligations. During the debate on
the 1972 Amendments, several Senators and Congressmen undertook
two concerted efforts to hobble Executive Order 11,246 and to cabin
the power of the lower courts to order race/gender-conscious relief.6"
They failed dismally on both occasions." By blocking attempts to
retreat from the equal achievement construct, Congress implicitly
acknowledged the construct's contribution to the overriding legislative goal of bringing minorities and women into the economic mainstream as rapidly as possible. That acknowledgement, moreover,
must be viewed against Congress' belated recognition that discrimination was not the result of individual "ill-will" 5 as was originally
conceived by Congress in 1964. By 1972, Congress understood that
neutral employment practices, intertwined with social forces beyond
the individual applicant's or employee's control, could trigger a racially stratified work force as decisively as ill-will.68 This understanding, in part, diluted the hostility the failed amendments sought to
exploit.
The Court, through a number of far reaching decisions, reinforced the determination expressed by Congress in 1964 and again in
11,246, its enforcement and its validity).
62. E.g., Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 854 (1971); Joyce v. McCrane, 320 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1970); cf. Porcelli v.
Titus, 431 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1970) (holding that the Board of Education's action of abolishing a promotional list, in order to create a more racially integrated faculty, did not violate the
white teachers' Fourteenth Amendment rights who were on the promotional list), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 944 (1971).
63. For a detailed description of their efforts, see Daly, Stotts' Denial of Hiring and
Promotion Preferencesfor Non-Victims: Draining the "Spirit"from Title VI1, 14 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 17, 72-76, (1986); see also Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478
U.S. 421, 466-70 (1986).
64. Two amendments to undermine Title VII and Executive Order 11,246 are of particular significance: the first attempted to limit the use of class actions in Title VII cases and the
second proposed barring the executive and judicial branches from ordering race-conscious relief for non-victims. Daly, supra note 63, at 72-73, 82-83; see H.R. REP. No. 9247, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. § 3(e), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 59, at 147; Sape & Hart, Title
VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
824, 841-45 (1972).
65. See supra note 59.
66. See Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise:Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept
of Employment Discrimination,71 MICH. L. REv. 59, 63 (1972).
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1972 to rid the workplace of discrimination and its lingering effects.
For example, in Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, the Supreme
Court described Title VII, as a "spur or catalyst which causes employers and unions to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the
last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this country's history."67 In Dothard v. Rawlinson, the Court acknowledged
the sweeping policy choice made by Congress in the 1972 amendments, holding that Title VII case law determining the liability of
private employers was equally applicable to public sector employers. 68 Dothard was a clear signal to the states and municipalities
that they risked substantial monetary liability and judicial scrutiny
of their employment practices if they did not immediately end personnel policies adversely affecting women and minorities. Consequently, public sector employers walked a "tightrope" risking liability to their minority employees if they did not act thoroughly enough
to eradicate the vestiges of discrimination, and liability to their nonminority employees if they acted too precipitously without sufficient
proof of their potential Title VII liability.69
After the 1972 amendments, when faced with the prospect of
statutory liability, which is less easily avoided than constitutional liability,70 public employers sought to forestall Title VII litigation by
establishing affirmative action programs to integrate their work
forces on an accelerated basis.71 Almost every state in the United
States has put in place an affirmative action plan containing prefer67. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975) (quoting United
States v. N.L. Industries, Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973)).
68. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 n.14 (1977).
69. Courts have frequently adopted the "tightrope" metaphor in affirmative action cases.

It was used for the first time by Judge Wisdom dissenting in Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum &
Chemical Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 230 (5th Cir. 1977) (Wisdom, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom.,

United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). See generally Comment, Walking a
Tightrope Without A Net: Voluntary Affirmative Action Plans After Weber, 134 U. PA. L.

REv.457 (1986) (authored by Jerome L. Epstein) (analyzing whether Weber requires an employer to show more than statistical evidence of under-representation of minorities in its work

force to justify the implementation of an affirmative action plan).
70.

See generally Phillips, Truth and Fiction in the Judicial Handling of Statutes, 44

LA. L. REv. 1309, 1313-18 (1984) (discussing judicial decision-making, methodology, and in-

terpretation in the context of statutory and constitutional liability).
71.

As a result, there were numerous decisions scrutinizing the affirmative action plans

instituted by public employers. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616
(1987); Janowiak v. Corporate City of South Bend, 750 F.2d 557 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
109 S.Ct. 1310 (1989); Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1040 (1984).
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ences in hiring and promotion to minorities.1 2 Countless local govern72. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 44.19.444 - 44.19.450 (1985), and ALASKA ADMIN. ORDER No. 59, reported in 8A Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 453:225; Arizona Exec. Order No.
83-5, reported in 8A Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 453:436; CAL Gov'T CODE §§ 1940019406, 19790-19798 (West 1980), and Cal. Exec. Order No. B-85-81 and D-20-83, reported
In 8A Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 453:853; COLO. ADMIN. CODE § 1-6-1, reprinted in 8A
Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 453:1039, COLO. ADMIN. CODE §§ Pl1-2-I - 11-2-4, reprinted

In 8A Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 453:1106-07, COLO. ADMIN. CODE § 80.9, reprintedin
8A Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 453:1128, and COLO. ADMIN. CODE § 90.13, reprintedin
8A Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 453:1157; CoNN GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-68 (West Supp.
1985), reported in 8A Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 453:1213, and Conn. Exec. Order No. 9,
reported in 8A Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 453:1250; Del. Exec. Order Nos. 74, 81, and
102, reported in 8A Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 453:1446; D.C. CODE § 1-2524, reported
In 8A Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 453:1610; D.C. CODE §§ 1-507 - 1-511 (1981), reported
In 8A Fiar Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 453:1635; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 110.112 (West
Supp.1982), reportedin 8A Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 453:1839-40, and Fla. Exec. Order
No. 79-50, reported in 8A Fair EmpI. Prac. (BNA) 453:1827; Ga. Exec. Order dated July 29,
1976, reported in 8A Fair EmpI. Prac. Man. (BNA) 453:2051; Hawaii Exec. Order No. 77-4
and Admin. Directive 80-2, reported in 8A Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 453:2259, and
HAWAII EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY REGULATIONS §§ 12-31-1 - 12-31-7, reprintedin

8A Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 453:2351-56; ILL DEP'T OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROCEDURAL

& PUBLIC CONTRACT RULES §§ 750.130 - 170 (1984), reported in 8A Fair Empl. Prac. Man.
(BNA) 453:2713; IND. CODE ANN. §§ 4-15-12-1 et seq. (Supp. 1985); IOWA ADMIN. CODE
§ 240, Chapters 8.1(1)-8.7(6), reprinted in 8A Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 453:3091-98,
and IOWA ADMIN. CODE § 240, Chapter 19B, §§ 19B.1-B8, reprintedin 8A Fair Empl. Prac.
Man. (BNA) 453:3151-54; KAN. ADMIN. REGS. §§, 21-30-14 - 20, reprintedin 8A Fair EmpI.
Prac. Man. (BNA) 453:3306; Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 45.550 -45.640 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1980), and Ky. Exec. Order Nos. 80-106 and 84-549, reported in 8B Fair EmpI. Prac. Man.
(BNA) 455:74; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 781-790 (1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 78A,

§ 7A (1977), reportedin Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 455:645, and Md. Exec. Order dated
December 9, 1970, reprinted in 8B Fair. Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 455:655; Mass. Exec.
Order Nos. 227 and 237, reported in 8B Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 455:883-84, and
Mass. Equal Employment Opportunity Anti-Discrimination and Affirmative Action Program
(Admin. Bull. 75-14), reprinted in 3A Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 455:961; MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 37.2210 (West 1985), Mich. Exec. Order No. 1983-4, reported in 8B Fair
Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 455:1030, and Mich. Civil Rts. Div. Directive dated April 1978,
reprinted in 8B Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 455:1132; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 43A.19 (West
Supp. 1985), and Minn. Dep't of Human Rights Regulations, ch. 5000, §§ 3420-3430, reprintedin 8B Fair Empl. Prac. Man (BNA) 455:1301; Miss. State Personnel Board Manual of
Policies, Rules 5.10-5.10.2, reprinted in 8B Fair EmpI. Prac. Man. (BNA) 455:1505; Mo.
Exec. Order No. 82-27, reported in 8B Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 455:1643, and Mo.
CODE OF STATE (8 CSR) 60-3.080, reprintedin 8B Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 455:1715;
Mont. Exec. Order No. 24-81, reported in 8B Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 455:1845; NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 81-1355-1368 (1981), and Neb. Exec. Order dated June 16, 1978, reported in
8B Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 455:2161; Nev. Exec. Order dated February 22, 1983,
reported in 8B Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 455:2226; N.H. Exec. Order No. 81-3, reported
In 8B Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 455:2436, and N.H. State Plan for Equal Employment in
Apprenticeship and Training, reprinted in 8B Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 455:2531-2543;
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-34 (West 1976), NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:2-1-:2-4 (West Supp. 1985),
N.J. Exec. Order No. 61, reportedin 3 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 25,722; N.M. Exec. Order
No. 81-45, reported in 8B Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 455:2849, and N.M. Human Rts.
§§ XI-XII, reprinted in 8B Fair. Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 455:2881-82; N.Y. Exec. Law
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ment units have implemented similar plans. These programs reflect
democratic acceptance of the equal achievement construct. Furthermore, in virtually every instance it was a white legislative majority
that voluntarily disadvantaged itself to benefit minority group
members.
The adoption of race-conscious preferences by states and municipal governments raised the difficult question of the relationship between the anti-discrimination norm of the Equal Protection Clause
and that of Title VII. While various Justices and scholarly commentators have contributed mightily to the intellectual frenzy over this
question, a definitive answer has yet to emerge.73 In not a single case
has the Court ever considered race-conscious preferences under both
§ 296 (McKinney 1982), N.Y. Exec. Order Nos. 6 and 20, reported in 8B Fair EmpI. Prac.
Man. (BNA) 455:3071-72, and N.Y. COMP. CODES R_ & REGS. tit. 9, §466, reprinted in 8B
Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 455:3125; Omo Rav. CODE ANN. § 4112.04(A)(10) (Anderson Supp. 1980), Ohio Exec. Order dated September 13, 1973, reported in 3 Empl. Prac.
Guide (CCH) T26,715, Ohio Dep't of State Personnel Rules and Regulations, ch. 123:1-49-01
- 49-47, reprinted in 8B Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 457:231, Ohio Bureau of Equal Employment Opportunity for Construction Regulations, ch. 123:2-3-01-:2-3-09, et seq., reprinted
in 8B Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 457:282, and Ohio State Apprenticeship Council Rules
4101:1-5-02-:1-5-15, reprinted in 8B Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 457:307; OKLA. STAT.
AN. tit. 74, § 840.25 (Vest Supp. 1985), reported in Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA)
457:433-34, and Okla. Exec. Order No. 79-14, reportedin 8B Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA)
457:427-428; OR. REV. STAT. §§ 182.100, 243.315, and 659.025 (1983), Or. Exec. Order No.
79-22, reported in 8B Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 45:709, and OR. ADMN. R. 839-11-200,
reprinted in 8B Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 457:693; Pa. Exec. Order No. 1984-1, reported
in 3 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 27,251, Regulations of Pa. Human Rts. §§ 49.51-49.102,
reprinted in 8B Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 457:889, Regulations of Pa. Dep't of Labor
and Industry, Industrial Board, §§ 81.1-81.95, reprinted in 8B Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA)
457:935, Affirmative Action Guidelines of the Pa. Human Relations Commission, reprintedin
8B Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 457:851, and Pa. Employee Selection Guidelines § 15 (1
Pa. Bull. 2359 (1971)), reprinted in 8B Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 457:861; R.I. Exec.
Order No. 85-11, reprinted in 8B Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 457:1245; S.D. ADMIN. R.
§§ 55:01:02:04-:01:13:05, reprinted in 8B Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 457:1765-66; TENN.
CODE ANN. § 4-21-101 - 407, (Supp. 1985), and Tenn. Exec. Order No. 8, reported in SB
Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 457:1865; Utah Exec. Order dated May 4, 1979, reported in
8B Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 457:2218; Va. Exec. Order No. 1-86, reported in 8B Fair
Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 457:2626; Wash. Exec. Order No. 85-09, reported in 8B Fair Empl.
Prac. Man. (BNA) 457:2867, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.04.100 - 49.04.130 (1974), reprinted in 8B Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 457:2873-74, WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-08298(4)(g), reprinted in 8B Fair EmpI. Prac. Man. (BNA) 457:2910, WASH. ADMIN. CODE
§§ 168-18-011 - 168-18-100, reprinted in 8B Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 457:2928a-28c,
and WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 296-04-300 - 296-04-480, reprinted in 8B Fair Empl. Prac. Man.
(BNA) 457:2970; W. Va. Order No. 16-78, reported in 8B Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA)
457:3026; Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 16.765 and 230.01-230.89 (West Supp. 1985), and Wis. Exec.
Order Nos. 9, 26, and 28, reported in 8B Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 457:3217-18.
73. See supra note 12. For a more elaborate bibliography, see Daly, supra note 6, at 18
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the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII.
Despite the uncertainty produced by the absence of a direct answer, a synthesis of the existing case law suggested that the Equal
Protection Clause and Title VII were unstable partners in pursuit of
equality in the work place. Ultimately, a consensus formed that in
examining an employer's decision to implement an affirmative action
plan containing race/gender-conscious preferences the Court would
probe most deeply in two areas: (1) the factual predicate underlying
the employer's decision to implement the plan7 4 and (2) the impact
of the plan on "innocent" employees who bore no responsibility for
past or present discrimination suffered by minority employees. 75 The
Court scrutinized both areas regardless of the particular norm involved. It seemed to make no difference whether the plaintiff challenged the preference under Title VII or the Equal Protection
Clause. The Court employed the same analysis. Because the decisions of the 1988 Term left the area concerning the impact on "innocent" employees undisturbed, this Article will not address the controlling principles. In contrast, the decisions of the 1988 Term
significantly departed from the Court's prior analysis of the factual
predicate issue. By transforming the substantive content of the principles used to evaluate statistical disparities, the Court effectively
promoted the equal access construct over the equal achievement construct, thereby moving closer to Harlan and Bickel's color-blind
standard and away from Blackmun and Ely's tolerance of race-con74. The "factual predicate" refers to an employer's basis for believing it has discriminated in the past. This basis usually includes statistical proof manifesting underrepresentation
of minorities in its labor force. Daly, supra note 6, at 20.
75. In evaluating the impact of race/gender-conscious criteria on "innocent" employees
the Court asks three questions: (1) does the plan entail the discharge of non-minority employees and their replacement by minority employees; (2) does the plan establish an absolute bar
to the advancement of non-minority employees; and (3) is the plan designed to maintain racial
balance or simply eliminate racial imbalance? These are the same questions which the Court
first considered in United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208-09 (1979). They were
used in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), without substantial modification to evaluate the impact of the 10% set.aside program on "innocent" white contractors. Id. at 484-85
(Burger, C.J.); id. at 514-15 (Powell, J.). In only one out of the nine affirmative action cases
decided before the 1988 Term has the Court found the impact of the challenged plan so burdensome to non-minority employees that the Court struck it down. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 279-84 (1986). The Court's overall reluctance to use the "innocent"
employee analysis vigorously, until Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989), and Independent
Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 443 U.S. 193 (1989), also reflected its preference for the
equal achievement construct over the equal access construct. See infra notes 238-53 and accompanying text.
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scious preferences.
B.

How Statistics Have Come to Play Such a Pivotal Role in
the Equal Access/Equal Achievement Debate

"In cases concerning racial discrimination, 'statistics often tell
much and the Courts listen 77 has long been an axiom of employment litigation. In amending Title VII in 1972, Congress presaged
the significance of statistics:
In 1964, employment discrimination tended to be viewed as a series
of isolated and distinguishable events, for the most part due to illwill on the part- of some identifiable individual or organization
. . . . This view has not been borne out by experience.
Employment discrimination as viewed today [1972] is a far
more complex and pervasive phenomenon. Experts familiar with
the subject generally describe the problem in terms of "systems"
and "effects" rather than simply intentional wrongs, and the literature on the subject is replete with discussion of, for example, the
mechanics of seniority and lines of progression, perpetuation of the
present effects of pre-act discriminatory practices through various
institutional devices, and testing and validation requirements.78

Because statistics are an ideal mechanism for exploring the differences and similarities accorded different groups and measuring "systems" and "effects," they have assumed a pivotal role in employment
discrimination litigation. Statistical analyses are utilized extensively
by both plaintiffs and defendants alike."
76. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
77. Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 426 (8th Cir. 1970) (quoting
Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir.), affd per curiam, 371 U.S. 37
(1962)). The Supreme Court enthusiastically jumped on the statistics bandwagon in the early,
critical years of its Title VII jurisprudence. "Our cases make it unmistakably clear that
'[s]tatistical analyses have served and will continue to serve an important role' in cases in
which the existence of discrimination is a disputed issue." International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977). Of course, statistical proof must be focused, comprehensible, and relevant to the jobs at issue. This is not always the case. As one court testily
observed, "too many use statistics as a drunk man uses a lamppost - for support, and not
illumination." Keely v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 404 F. Supp. 573, 579 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
78. S. REP. No. 1137, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1970); see S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 5 (1971). See generally Blumrosen, Strangersin Paradise:Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
and the Concept of Employment Discrimination,71 MICH L. REv. 59 (1972) (examining the
future of statistics in discrimination suits).
79. See generallyW. CONNOLLY JR., D. PETERSON & M. CONNOLLY, USE OF STATISTICS
IN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY LITIGATION §§ 1.01-2.02 (1989) (outlining the general history of the
use of statistics in civil rights cases and by plaintiffs); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1331-91 (2d ed. 1983) (discussing the types and sources of statis-
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The principles of statistical analysis which have evolved under
Title VII to determine employer liability for discrimination are inextricably linked to the Court's affirmative action jurisprudence under
both Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause. Thus, a brief review
of these principles is necessary to assess the critical cases of the 1988
Term and the new direction of the Rehnquist Court.
A Title VII plaintiff has essentially two theories of liability from
which to choose.8" The first is the disparate treatment theory in
which the plaintiff attempts to show that the defendant's alleged discriminatory conduct was prompted by an actual, purposeful intent to
discriminate.8 ' This theory closely resembles the actual, purposeful
intent standard of the Equal Protection Clause enunciated in Washtical proof, the proper geographical scope and time-frame of statistics, and the proper weight
to be given statistical proof); 1C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R.RicHARDs, EMPLOYMENT DisCRIMINATION 63-104, 166-81 (2d ed. 1988) (describing the use of statistical proof in discrimination suits); Laycock, Statistical Proof and Theories of Discrimination,49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97 (1986) (examining the use of statistics in disparate treatment cases);
Montlack, Using Statistical Evidence to Enforce the Laws Against Discriminatidn, 22 CLaV.
ST. L. REV. 259 (1973) (analyzing the increasing'use of statistical evidence).
80. Not all commentators agree that the two theories are compatible. E.g., Fallon &
Weiler, Firefighters v. Stotts: Conflicting Models of Racial Justice, 1984 Sup. Cr. REV. 1, 1026; Fiss, supra note 15, at 237-40; Comment, When Doctrines Collide: Disparate Treatment,
DisparateImpact, and Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1755 (1989)
(authored by Anita M. Alessandra). At a minimum, the two theories are bottomed on the
principle that certain immutable characteristics (e.g., race, color, sex, national origin) and one
mutable characteristic, religion, are irrelevant to the market place because they are nonpredictive of success in employment. By removing these characteristics from consideration in an
employment decision, both theories advance fundamental notions of fairness and evenhandedness, It hardly seems fair to deny an individual an employment opportunity because of an
attribute such as race or gender over which that individual has no control. While the choice of
religion is subject to an individual's control, punishing a believer because of credo runs counter
to the nation's ethos dating from the colonies' first settlement through the waves of immigrants
in the 1900s and continuing even into the 1980-90s (e.g., Jews immigrating from the Soviet
Union). Fallon, supra note 21; Fiss, supra note 15, at 240-49. For an insightful analysis of the
tension between the two theories, see Blumoff & Lewis, Jr., The Reagan Court and Title VII:
A Common-Law Outlook on A Statutory Task, 69 N.C.L. REV. 1, 7-17 (1990).
81. According to the Supreme Court,
"[d]isparate treatment" ... is thi most easily understood type of discrimination.
The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences
in treatment.
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). See generally B,SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 79, at 1291-1324 (discussing the proof considerations in disparate treatment cases); 1 C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, supra note
79, at 39-46 (discussing various methods of proof used in systemic and, individual disparate
treatment claims).
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ington v. Davis.8 2 The theory embraces individual claims of disparate
treatment as well as systemic claims.83 In the latter case, the plaintiff alleged that the employer deliberately treated an entire category
of employees or applicants less favorably than another category because of the individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin."
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,85 Chief Justice Burger articulated
for a unanimous Court a second theory of liability which revolutionized employment discrimination law. Under this theory, later labeled
"disparate impact," the employer's motive was irrelevant. 86 "[G]ood
intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employ82. 426 U.S. 229, 232-42, 246 (1976).
83. An employer violates Title VII when he intentionally discriminates against an individual or a group of individuals bearing the protected characteristic. E.g., compare Texas
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (individual-gender); McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (individual-race) with Los Angeles Dep't of
Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (group-gender); International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (group-race). If the plaintiff in a class action
prevails on a claim of systemic disparate treatment, all members of the class are rebuttably
presumed to be victims of the employer's'prohibited discrimination and entitled to relief. The
employer, of course, remains free to demonstrate that it did not discriminate against specific
employees. It bears the burden of persuasion on this issue. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 359; Franks
v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 772 (1976).
84. Whether alleging individual or systemic discrimination, a plaintiff can establish a
prima facie case of disparate treatment using direct or circumstantial evidence. Compare Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (using direct evidence) with McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (using circumstantial evidence). If the plaintiff possesses
only circumstantial evidence, he must prove that: (1) he belonged to a protected group; (2) he
applied for a job for which he was qualified; (3) he was rejected; and (4) the employer continued to seek other applicants. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253
n.6; McDonell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802; see also Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
109 S.Ct. 2363, 2378 (1989) (applying McDonnell Douglas and Burdine and indicating that
the plaintiff's burden is not onerous); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977,
1003 n.4 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (restating the test in McDonnell Douglas). If the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case, the burden of going forward.shifts to the employer to articulate
a non-discriminatory reason for the treatment. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802-03;
see Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56. If the defendant produces evidence of a non-discriminatory
reason, the plaintiff must prove the reason pretextual. See generally Mendez, Presumptions of
DiscriminatoryMotive in Title VII DisparateTreatment Cases, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1129, 114344 (1980) (discussing the effect of a presumption of discriminatory motive). But see Belton,
Burdens of Pleadingand Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of Procedural
Justice, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1222-23 (1981) (arguing that an independent ground of
justification should be treated as an affirmative defense and the plaintiff should not be given
the opportunity to show that the justification was merely pretextual).
85. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
86. See generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 79, at 1322-94; 1 C. SULUVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, supra note 79, at 43-44; Willborn, The DisparateImpact
Model of Discrimination:Theory and Limits, 34 AM. U.L. REv. 799 (1985); Perry, The DisproportionateImpact Theory of Racial Discrimination,125 U. PA. L. RV.540 (1977).
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ment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in
headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job
capability .... Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the conse'87
quences of employment practices, not simply the motivation.
The disparate impact theory has been applied to a diverse range
of employment practices, including height and weight requirements,
testing procedures, and educational requirements."" Initially, the disparate impact theory was applied to objective hiring and promotion
devices.89 The Supreme Court ultimately expanded its scope by approving its use to evaluate subjective criteria such as a supervisor's
ratings, assessments of interpersonal skills, and other non-quantifiable characteristics."
Until recently, Title VII doctrine emphasized the two theories'
analytical distinctness.9 1 Linkage rather than separateness seems to
87. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432 (emphasis in the original). Not all scholars acknowledge the
legitimacy of the disparate impact theory, claiming it is inconsistent with Congressional intent.
E.g., Gold, Griggs' Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems, and Origin of the Adverse
Impact Definition of Employment Discrimination and a Recommendation for Reform, 7 INDUS. REL L.J. 429 (1985). Contra Rose, Subjective Employment Practices: Does the Discriminatory Impact Analysis Apply?, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 63, 77-81 (1988); Recent Developments, Title VII: Application of Impact Analysis of Subjective Employment Criteria Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988), 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav.
264, 269 (1989). As Professor Caldwell incisively points out, the adverse impact theory ultimately serves traditional entrepreneurial values such as efficiency and productivity by increasing the pool of capable employees who would otherwise be shut out from the labor force by
business practices of questionable value. Caldwell, Reaffirming the Disproportionate Effects
Standard of Liability in Title VII Litigation, 46 U. PIrr. L. REV. 555 (1985).
88, See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (height and weight requirements); Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (employment tests); Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (employment tests and educational requirements). If
the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of disparate impact, the employer must produce
evidence of business necessity or job-relatedness. SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 79, at
1328-31. See generally I C. SULLIVAN M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, supra note 79, at 147-95
(discussing the various attempts to create exceptions to the broad scope of a disparate impact
claim). A consistent verbal formulation of the quantum of evidence necessary to demonstrate a
legitimate business need has escaped the Court. Until the 1988 Term, the standard, however
formulated, seemed to have some teeth in it. E.g., Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432 (requiring a "manifest relationship to the employment in question."). Even if the employer had met his burden,
the plaintiff would nonetheless prevail upon a showing of an alternate practice with less adverse impact. In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 997-99 (1988), the Court
considerably relaxed the last two requirements, demanding only a "normal and legitimate"
business need.
89. See, e.g., Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd
and remanded, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989); Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1985).
90. Watson, 487 U.S. at 989-90.
91. In International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), the Court
typically observed:
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims that stress "dispa-
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be on the rise, however, with the Court currently describing the disparate impact theory as "functionally equivalent to intentional dis' Whether characterized as analytically distinct or
crimination." 92
functionally equivalent, both theories acknowledge a prominent role
for statistics in measuring claims of systemic disparate treatment
and disparate impact.9 There is no way to understand what the statistics really mean, however, without a consensus on the baseline or
standard against which they are to be interpreted. In Hazelwood
School District v. United States,9 4 a case involving allegations of
systemic disparate treatment, the Court laid down two general principles: (1) for non-skilled entry level jobs, the baseline was the racial
and gender makeup of the labor force in the relevant market area;
and (2) for jobs requiring specialized skills, the baseline was the racial and gender makeup of the labor force in the relevant market
area possessing those skills.95 In commenting upon its selection of
these baselines the Court explained:
"[A]bsent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force
more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of
the population in the community from which employees are hired.
Evidence of longlasting and gross disparity between the [racial and
ethnic] composition of a work force and that of the general population thus may be significant even though § 703(j) makes clear that
Title VII imposes no requirement that a work force mirror the general population."9
Hazelwood thus laid down the rule that evidence of "longlasting and
gross disparity" created a prima facie case of systemic disparate
treatment in violation of Title VII. 97 Evidence of a prima facie case
rate impact." The latter involve employment practices that are facially neutral in
their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group
than another and cannot be justified by business necessity. . . . Proof of discriminatory motive, we have held, is not required under a disparate-impact theory.
Id. at 336 n.15.

92. Watson, 487 U.S. at 987. For a powerful critique of the court's reasoning in Watson,
see Blumoff & Lewis, Jr., supra note 80, at 25-33.

93. While statistics are used forcefully in systemic treatment cases, they are more frequently found in disparate impact cases. W. CONNOLLY, JR., D. PETERSON & M. CONNOLLY,
supra note 79, § 2.01.
94. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
95. Id. at 307-08.
96. Id. at 307 (quoting International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
340 n.20 (1977)).
97. Id. at 307-08. The majority opinion hinted, and the dissent seemed to agree, that
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shifted the burden of going forward to the employer who had to
show a business necessity for the practice. In subsequent systemic
treatment cases, the Court cited Hazelwood approvingly and/or
fashioned alternate, consistent verbal precepts.98
In contrast, the Court never defined "disparate impact" in any
meaningful way, expressing a clear preference for a case-by-case
analysis. 98 The Court has recently approved of applying the Hazelwood formula and the alternate precepts to disparate impact cases as
well as to disparate treatment cases. 100 Some commentators have
longstanding and gross disparity could be measured by calculating the "standard deviation."
Id. at 308 n.14; id. at 317-20 & nn.5 & 9 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court had earlier
approved this methodology in Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496-97 n.17 (1977), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981), a jury selection case. See generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN,
supra note 79, at 1370-75; 1 C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, supra note 79, at 8091.
98. E.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982) (requiring a showing of "significantly discriminatory impact"); New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568,
584 (1979) (stating that a violation of the Act could be established by "statistical evidence
showing that an employment practice has the effect of denying the members of one race equal
access to employment opportunities."); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (requiring a showing that the defendant's practices of selecting applicants resulted "in a significantly discriminatory pattern").
99. The Court's opinions are sprinkled with observations such as statistics "come in
infinite variety and ... their usefulness depends on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances," Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 340, quoted in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487
U.S. 977, 996 n.3 (1988); cf McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13
(1973) (stating that the facts will vary in Title VII cases so that a given set of specifications to
establish a prima facie case may not be applicable in every situation).
According to EEOC Guidelines, adverse impact occurs if the selection rate of members of
a protected group is less than four-fifths of the rate at which the group with the highest selection rate is selected. EEOC Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.4(D) (1989). Some courts have adopted a "standard deviation" analysis analogizing to
the Supreme Court's decisions in jury selection cases. E.g., Rivera v. Wichita Falls, 665 F.2d
531, 536 n.7 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977)); Guardians
Ass'n of New York City Police Dep't v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 630 F.2d 79, 86 & n.4 (2d Cir.
1980) (citing Castaneda, 430 U.S. 482 (1977)); see supra note 97. See generally W. CONNOLLY, JR., D. PETERSON & M. CONNOLLY, supra note 79, § 11.08 (discussing the significance
that federal courts have attached to standard deviation analysis); Shoben, Differential PassFall Rates In Employment Testing: Statistical ProofUnder Title VII, 91 HARV. L. RaV. 793
(1978) (advocating the use of a statistical procedure to measure the possible discriminatory
affects of employment tests in Title VII cases).
Professors Zimmer, Sullivan & Richards probably sum up the Court's statistical asssessment most accurately. They describe the Court as "eyeballing" the numbers to find impact. M.
ZIMMER, C. SULLIVAN & R. RICHARDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DIscRIMINATION 247 (2d. ed. 1988).
100. In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994-95 (1988), a disparate
impact case, the Court assumed without discussion that the formula of the systemic disparate
treatment cases was fully applicable to disparate impact cases.
Our formulations, which have never been framed in terms of any rigid mathemati-

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol18/iss4/4

26

Daly: Affirmative Action, Equal Access and the Supreme Court's 1988 Ter

1990]

THE REHNQUIST COURT

similarly failed to see any difference in the kind of statistics needed
to prove a systemic disparate treatment case and a disparate impact
101
case.
How the Hazelwood formula of "longlasting and gross disparity" between the racial makeup of the relevant labor force and that
of the employer's work force crossed the line dividing the liability
side of the Court's Title VII jurisprudence from the affirmative action side is easy to understand. 0 2 Mindful of the rule laid down in
cal formula, have consistently stressed that statistical disparities must be sufficiently
substantial that they raise such an inference of causation. In Griggs, for example we
examined "requirements [that] operate[d] to disqualify Negroes at a substantially
higher rate than white applicants." 401 U.S., at 426, 91 S. Ct. 851. Similarly, we
said in Albermarle Paper Co. that plaintiffs are required to show "that the tests in
question select applicants for hire or promotion in a racial pattern significantly different from that of the pool of applicants." 422 U.S., at 425, 95 S. Ct. 2375. Later
cases have framed the test in similar terms. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
at 246-247, 96 S. Ct. 2040 ("hiring and promotion practices disqualifying substantially disproportionate numbers of blacks"); Dothard,433 U.S., at 329, 97 S. Ct.
2726 (employment standards that "select applicants for hire in a significantly discriminatory pattern"); Beazer, 440 U.S. at 584, 99 S. Ct. at 1365 ("statistical evidence showing that an employment practice has the effect of denying the members
of one race equal access to employment opportunities"); Teal, 457 U.S. at 446, 102
S. Ct. 2530 ("significantly discriminatory impact").
Id.
101. Professors Sullivan, Zimmer and Richards even go so far as to say that the difference "between prima facie cases under the two theories is essentially a matter of the scope of
response available to the defendant." 1 C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RicHARDs, supra note
79, at 104; see Blumrosen, The Legacy of Griggs: Social Progressand Subjective Judgments,
63 CHL[-]KENT L. REv. 1, 30-34 (1987) (discussing the applicability of the disparate impact
model to cases involving the subjective judgments of employees); Laycock, Statistical Proof
and Theories of Discrimination,49 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 102 (1986) (discussing the
contradictions between statistical and individual proof); Note, Availability of Disparate Impact Theory to Attack a Multicomponent Employment System, 31 VILL L. REv. 377, 384-85
n.29 (1989) (authored by Penelope M. Taylor) (discussing the four-fifths rule and the standard deviation method as two methods of proving discriminatory impact).
102. Determining the appropriate labor pool is not necessarily easy. The difficulty is
illustrated by the decisions of two panels of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
both of which were reviewing reverse discrimination challenges to affirmative action plans
adopted by different District of Columbia agencies. In Hammon v. Barry, 826 F.2d 73, 77
(D.C. Cir. 1987), limited reh'g en banc granted, 833 F.2d 367 (D.C. Cir. 1988), order granting reh'g vacated, 841 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1036 (1988), one panel
used a metropolitan area figure in which blacks constituted 29.3 % of the workforce. Barely a
year later, another panel used a workforce figure in which blacks constituted 60%. Ledoux v.
District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 1293, 1304 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1987), limited reh'g en banc
granted, 833 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1987), panel decision and order granting reh'g en bane
vacated and remanded without opinion upon parties' joint motion, 841 F.2d 400 (D.C. Cir.
1988); see Abron v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 439 F. Supp. 1095, 1105 (D. Md. 1977)
(holding that "the appropriate labor force is that which is encompassed in the area within
which an employer can reasonably expect people to commute"). See generally 1 C. SULLIVAN,
M. ZIMMER & R. RicHAJsS, supra note 79, at 67-73 (discussing the use of statistical evidence,
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Griggs v. Duke Power Co., that good faith was no defense to a valid
Title VII claim, 103 and unmindful of the theoretical distinctions between claims of systemic disparate treatment and disparate impact,
employers began to compare the racial and gender composition of
their work force with the racial and gender composition of the appropriate labor market.104 When the comparison revealed evidence of
long lasting and gross disparity approaching the Hazelwood baseline,
they modified their employment procedures for the purpose of eliminating the disparity.1 05 In some instances, they simply intensified
their recruiting efforts in minority communities or eliminated the
employment practices responsible for the disparity. In many instances, both public and private employers initiated racial preferences in hiring and promotion decisions in order to make the racial
and gender makeup of their
work force more closely resemble that of
08
pool.
labor
relevant
the
Self-imposed remediation by employers posed several problems
for the Court. As a threshold matter, there was the question of
whether Title VII as a guarantor of equal access even permitted a
private employer to adopt an affirmative action plan with an equal
achievement component. The Court answered that inquiry positively
in United Steelworkers v. Weber,107 in 1979 when it approved a private employer's voluntary implementation of a race-conscious plan in
the absence of a judicial or administrative finding of liability. In
1987, in Johnson v. TransportationAgency, 10 8 it gave a similar answer to a public sector employer.
Both cases endorsed the Hazelwood methodology of comparison
in an affirmative action context and considerably loosened its restraints. In making this endorsement, the Court revealed a great deal
about its views on affirmative action in general. The endorsement
signalled the Court's unwillingness to accept justifications for racelegitimate statistical manipulation, and the probability theory in making comparisons between
the employer's labor force and the actual labor market); Braun, Statistics and the Law: Hy-

pothesis Testing and Its Application to Title VII Cases, 32 HASTINGS LJ. 59, 61-67 (1980)
(discussing the difficulties associated with choosing the proper labor pool statistics in Title VII
cases).

103. Griggs, 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
104. Employers were not alone in having great difficulty in keeping the two theories
separate. So did the courts. 2 C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RicIARns, supra note 61, at
281-94.
105.

See Shoben, supra note 15, at 894-96.

106. See Id. at 894 & nn. 24-25.
107.
108.

443 U.S. 193, 201-08 (1979).
480 U.S. 616, 626-40 (1987).
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conscious preferences other than self-remediation. Employers were
not free to consider race in making hiring or promotion decisions in
order to raise their own standing in the minority community or even
to alleviate the dissatisfaction of minority employees. The Court
eased the way for race-conscious programs but only to the extent
that the employer could justify their adoption to eliminate "longlasting and gross disparity" for which the employer presumably bore the
responsibility. 109 Culpability, although the employer did not have to
directly confess to it, was what gave statutory legitimacy to the challenged program. This culpability, moreover, was not dependent on
the employer's intent to discriminate. The Court dispensed with
moral blameworthiness. Culpability could spring from the adoption
of neutral employment practices having an adverse impact as well as
from conscious, purposeful motivation. Intent and impact were both
"sins of racism" for which the Court would approve affirmative action "only as a precise penance ....."110
While the Court's linking of remediation to this unique concept
of culpability prompted scholarly criticism,"' the degree to which it
thwarted employers' desires to implement race-conscious preferences
in affirmative action plans is difficult to assess. The most likely reason for an employer needing to raise its standing in a minority community is disproportionality between the racial composition of its
work force and that of the local labor market. Similarly, the most
likely reason for an employer needing to alleviate the dissatisfaction
of minority employees is the use of hiring and/or promotion criteria
having a disproportionate impact. The Court's linking of culpability
to remediation, thus, had more symbolic significance than anything
else. It served to protect the use of race-conscious preferences from
more intense criticism and lessened the political incentive to dispute
their adoption. In light of the substantial criticism of race-conscious
preferences, even when linked to remediation, it is easy to imagine
the intense criticism likely to have erupted if the Court had approved
of race-conscious preferences for purposes unrelated to denials of
equal access. By restricting race-conscious "remedies" to culpability,
the Court was, on the surface of its jurisprudence, only permitting
the employer to correct for a denial of equal access which occurred
109. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307 (1977).
110. Sullivan, Comment, Sins of Discrimination:Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases,
100 HARV. L. REv. 78, 80-81 (1986); Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and Social
Engineers, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1312 (1986).
111. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 110.
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intentionally or unintentionally somewhere in the hiring or promotion process.
At surface level, Hazelwood's formula for selecting the appropriate labor pool for statistical comparisons can facilely be interpreted as a device to promote equal access. Careful attention to the
statistical baselines selected by the Court, however, exposes the
Court's transformation of the Hazelwood formula from an equal access construct to an equal achievement construct.11

2

Underlying the

transformation was the looseness with which the Court applied the
principle of using general population figures for unskilled jobs and
refined figures for skilled jobs. Until the 1988 Term, the Court consistently applied the Hazelwood formula to prefer the labor pool
which had the greater percentage of minority group members.1 13
There is only one possible exception to that observation and even the
exception evaporates under analysis. The selection of the labor pool
with the greater percentage of women or blacks accelerated the integration of these previously excluded groups into the economic mainstream. It upset the economic status quo by refusing to look at where
minorities actually were on the rungs of career ladders (almost inevitably at the bottom) and looked to where they would have been absent public, private, and institutional racism and sexism. Furthermore, by selecting the labor pool with the greater percentage of
minority group members, the Court assured that the employer would
keep the race/gender-conscious plan in effect for a much longer period of time until, for example, its work force obtained racial/gender
parity with the labor pool.
1. The Employment Cases
a.

Weber

Fearful of litigation by disgruntled black employees and in response to heavy pressure from the Office of Federal Contract Compliance threatening disbarment from federal contracts, Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation (Kaiser) and the United
Steelworkers Union of America (USWA) entered into a collective
bargaining plan, one provision of which was designed to open up career paths in the skilled trades to minority workers."4 The collective
bargaining agreement provided that unskilled workers would be of112. See infra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
113. See Daly, supra note 6.
114. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
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fered the opportunity to participate in a training program, the successful completion of which would enable them to move into a different career ladder with higher paying jobs.115 Kaiser admitted
applicants to the training program based on their employment seniority and their race: 50% of the trainee slots were reserved for
unskilled black workers.1 * When Weber, a white applicant, was
turned down in favor of black employees with less seniority, he sued
claiming that the training program violated Section 703 of Title VII
which, inter alia, prohibited discrimination in apprenticeship programs.11 7 Weber essentially contended that Title VII guaranteed
equal access and nothing more. 1 " He sought equal access and nothing less.
Kaiser defended its adoption of the race-conscious program by
pointing to the wide disparity between the percentage of skilled
black craftworkers it employed (1.83%) and the percentage of
blacks in the local labor force (39%).1118 The Court approved this
comparison, without discussion, finding the race-conscious program
was designed "to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories.1 120 Had the Court used the 4.3 %
figure, which approximated the percentage of blacks possessing the
appropriate trades skills, 21 the imbalance in the case would have
disappeared and Kaiser's right to rely on the local work force discrepancy as prima facie evidence of a valid potential Title VII claim
would have been severely undermined.
That the Court approved the Kaiser/USWA affirmative action
plan is somewhat surprising. As Justice Rehnquist's dissent suggested, the drafters of Title VII in 1964 may have had only the
equal access model of equality in mind.12 2 On the other hand, as
Justice Brennan's majority opinion makes abundantly clear, Congress intended Title VII to be a potent tool, accomplishing the herculean task of integrating minorities into the nation's economic
mainstream.1 23 The Kaiser/USWA plan furthered that goal. Use of
115. Id. at 197-98.
116. Id. at 199.
117. Id. at 199-200.
118. Id. at 193, 197-200, 209-11.
119.' Id. at 198-99.
120. Id. at 209.
121. See id. at 212 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (advocating the adoption of the "arguable violations" theory).
122. Weber, 443 U.S. at 230-54 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 202-08. Dean Schatzki's observation concerning both Justices' analysis of

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1990

31

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 4 [1990], Art. 4

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:1057

a labor force figure reflecting the percentage of blacks with skilled
trades experience would have locked minorities into the status quo.
That status quo, moreover, was itself the product of countless discriminatory acts by the public and private sector, including the
skilled trades unions. The plant where Kaiser implemented the challenged training program was located in Louisiana. Blacks had almost
no opportunity to pursue skilled trades positions in that state prior to
the time Weber was decided.124 Louisiana's schools were racially segregated, and the schools for black children were considerably inferior
to those for white children. 12 5 Vocational training for blacks in the
skilled trades was essentially unheard of. Discrimination in the private sector reinforced and compounded discrimination in the public
sector. Because of discrimination by employers, blacks stood no realistic chance of gaining entry level jobs in industries with career ladders leading to skilled trades jobs. Because of union discrimination,
blacks were excluded from apprenticeship programs teaching such
skills. In short, racial discrimination in employment in the South was
as systemic and pernicious as segregation in education. Hobbled by
years of discrimination in education and employment, minority
workers were simply unable to enter the race for economic security
and better jobs without a boost.
With hindsight it can be seen that the Court fashioned the disparate impact theory in Griggs to compel employers to dismantle the
blocks upon which they built their segregated work force. 26 It used
Weber to accelerate the dismantling process, to encourage employers
to voluntarily remedy the effects of over a hundred years of employment and educational apartheid by others. It selected general labor
pool statistics rather than more refined ones to promote equal
Congress' intent is worth noting, however.
[W]hether or not the members of Congress thought of voluntary affirmative action,
they did not discuss the issue. That being so, it is difficult for me to understand how
either the majority or the dissent found much solace in the history. Justice Rehnquist stated, on the one hand, that Congress never thought about the matter; on the
other hand, the Justice was convinced the history rejected affirmative action .... I
fail to see how the legislative history can lead someone to both of Rehnquist's conclusions -that the Congress did not deal with affirmative action and that the Congress clearly rejected it. For the majority, Justice Brennan also overstates enormously the meaning of the legislative history. The truth is, Congress did not discuss
or debate the issue.
Schatzki, United Steelworkers of America v. Weber: An Exercise in UnderstandableIndecision, 56 WASH. L. REV. 51, 66-67 (1980).
124. Weber, 443 U.S. at 212 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
125. Id..
126. See Blumrosen, supra note 66, at 62.
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achievement over equal access.
b. Johnson
The use of general undifferentiated labor force statistics to promote the equal achievement construct in voluntary affirmative actions plans received a second strong boost from the Court in Johnson
v. Transportation Agency. 12 7 Between Weber and Johnson, the
Court had approved the use of such statistics in court-ordered plans,
a topic outside the scope of this Article.1 28 In Johnson, in'response to
a striking disparity between the racial and gender makeup of its
work force and that of the local labor pool, the Transportation
Agency had adopted an affirmative action plan which strongly encouraged management personnel to consider race and gender as a
"plus" in hiring and promotion decisions. 29 In deciding to implement such a plan the Transportation Agency was heavily influenced
by the concentration of women in certain positions, such as office
jobs, and their complete absence in other positions, such as those
involving manual labor.130 No woman held a skilled craft position
even though women comprised approximately 5 % of the refined local labor pool. 31
Johnson, a white male, challenged the Transportation Agency's
selection of Joyce, a female, for a road dispatcher's job. Johnson was
tied for second in the selection list with a score of 75, but the appointing official picked Joyce, who was ranked next with a score of
73. The appointing official considered the Transportation Agency's
affirmative action goals in making the final decision. 3
A majority of the Justices, citing Weber, approved the Transportation Agency's reliance on general labor force statistics as the
baseline for its decision to implement a gender-conscious affirmative
action plan. It endorsed the Agency's reliance on the theory that the
road dispatcher's job was one in a series of increasingly more responsible jobs which were filled by employees who were unskilled workers
127. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
128.

E.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Local 28 of the Sheet Metal

Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986); see also Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of
Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986) (holding that a consent decree is a

proper method of obtaining affirmative action under 703(g) of Title VII even though a party
objects to its use). For a brief description of these cases, see Appendix, infra pp. 1128-32.

129. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 620-23.
130. Id.
131.

Id. at 619-22.

132. Id. at 623-26.
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at the time they were hired. Since the "feeder" positions1 33 called for
no specialized skills, the Transportation Agency could look at the
gender makeup of the general labor pool in deciding if a discrepancy
sufficient to constitute a "manifest imbalance" existed.1 34 Johnson
represented a significant development in the Court's affirmative action jurisprudence for two reasons. First, it extended Weber's approval of voluntary race-conscious plans in the private sector under
Title VII to gender-conscious plans and to plans in the public sector
as well.13 5 Second, Johnson altered without discussion Weber's
formula authorizing such plans "to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories." 138 The clear focus of Weber was the dismantling of years of both state-imposed and
privately-enforced apartheid in education and the market place. The
discrimination in Johnson, as Justice Scalia acerbically pointed out
in his dissent, arose from very different social forces. The absence of
women arguably was attributable in part to women's conception of
what were appropriate jobs for women as much, if not more, than
any policy of excluding female applicants. 3
That the decision in Johnson was specifically designed to promote equal achievement over equal access is readily revealed by the
different approach taken by the majority opinion and Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion. Although Justice O'Connor voted to
approve the Transportation Agency's use of the gender-conscious
preference, she did so because refined labor pool statistics showed
that five percent of the workers possessing the necessary skills for the
road dispatcher's job were female.1 3 8 She labelled the complete absence of female employees among the Transportation Agency's
skilled trades workers the "inexorable zero."1 9 Her vision demanded
the termination of the gender-conscious preference when the percentage of female skilled trades workers reached five percent of the
Transportation Agency's labor force in such jobs. Under the major133.

See Daly, supra note 6, at 24 (discussing feeder positions).

134. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 631-40.
135. Of course, it did nothing to resolve the critical question alluded to earlier: whether
race/gender-conscious plans compatible with Title VII nonetheless violated the equal protection clause. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.

136. See also Daly, supra note 6, at 26-27 (pointing out that the Court in Johnson
reduced the quantum of proof required to establish the necessary factual predicate for imple-

menting a voluntary race/gender conscious program to proof of a mere statisical imbalance in
the work force).
137. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 668.
138. Id. at 656 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
139.

Id. at 657.
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ity opinion, however, the plan terminates at a much higher figure,
roughly fifty percent. Clearly, by selecting the general labor pool statistics, the majority favored equal achievement over equal access.
In sum, both Weber and Johnson can be read as encouraging
employers to adopt the equal achievement construct by looking to
general labor force statistics rather than more refined ones. As a policy choice, this encouragement is quite sensible. Congress' overriding
goal, in the enactment of Title VII and in its 1972 amendments, was
the integration of previously excluded groups, especially racial minorities, into the mainstream of the American economy. Reliance on
refined labor pool statistics would have frustrated that goal. Refined
labor pool statistics represent the combined effect of years of public
and private discrimination. 140 They are the product of overt and subtle forces which excluded minorities and women from skilled craft
positions and professional employment. They are the product of substandard schools which inadequately prepared minorities for jobs,
other than the most menial, and imposed stereotypical notions of
"women's work" on the female labor force.
c. Wygant
There is one pre-1988 Term decision, Wygant v. Jackson Board
of Education,141 which appears to cut against the equal access/equal
achievement analysis described above. Reflection, however, shows
that this is not the case. The critical issue in Wygant was whether
the Equal Protection Clause prohibited a public sector employer
from voluntarily adopting a collectively bargained race-conscious
layoff plan.1 42 The plan called for a scuttling of the traditional "lasthired, first-fired" rule in order to, preserve very recent gains in minority employment.1 43 The gains themselves were the result of a voluntary affirmative action plan. But that plan ignored Hazelwood's
140. The fact that, in Johnson, only five percent of the workers who possessed the necessary skills for the road dispatcher's job were female is exemplary of the type of past discrimi-

nation which affirmative action programs were created to counteract. Instead of helping
women and minorities achieve greater skilled labor employment equality, the O'Connor formulation, requiring the use of refined labor pool statistics, would actually help those employers

"'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices." Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
141. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
142. Id. at 269-70.
143. Id. at 270-71.
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admonition;144 instead of looking to the labor pool of qualified minority teachers, it looked to the percentage of minority students in the
Jackson School District. 4 5
For the purpose of the analysis contained in Part I of this Article, Wygant advances the equal achievement construct by making it
easier for public employers to adopt race-conscious preferences without violating the Fourteenth Amendment. The most important section of the Court's opinion in Wygant dealt with its incorporation of
Hazelwood into the Court's affirmative action jurisprudence under
the Equal Protection Clause. Simply put, Wygant stands for the proposition that before a public sector employer can implement an affirmative action plan, it must be able to show "a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary.

1 46

That

"strong basis in evidence" is controlled by Hazelwood and, thus, appears to be synonymous with Weber's "prima facie" standard and
Johnson's "manifest imbalance" standard. 4 7 Wygant advances the
decision in Washington v. Davis,14 8 where the Supreme Court forcefully laid down the rule that an Equal Protection Clause violation
had to be predicated on actual, purposeful intent.14 9 Wygant teaches
that a public sector employer can rely on a mere statistical imbalance to demonstrate "a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion
that remedial action was necessary.1 150 Thus, consistent with the

Fourteenth Amendment, a public sector employer can implement
race/gender-conscious preferences based on evidence which standing
alone would be insufficient to prove the underlying violation!
What undermined the constitutionality of the layoff plan
144. See supra notes 94-106 and accompanying text (explaining the Hazelwood principles used in establishing a primaface case of systemic disparate treatment under Title VII).
145. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274-75.
146. Technically speaking, only the four Justices in the plurality endorsed the "strong
basis in evidence" standard. Justice White concurred in the judgment. In his view, the layoff
procedure was tantamount to firing white employees in order to hire black employees, an act
clearly violating the equal protection clause. Id. at 294-95 (White, J., concurring).
147. Justice Brennan attempted to distinguish the two standards in Johnson, 480 U.S. at
633-34 nn.10-1 1. His success is questionable. See Daly, supra note 6, at 34-36. The similarity
between the two formulae is significant. In Johnson, 480 U.S. at 632, 635, the majority labelled the statistical disparity a "manifest imbalance." Justice O'Connor labelled it "prima
facie evidence of past discrimination." Id. at 649-52 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Moreover, the
Court employs both formulae in measuring the adequacy of the statistical discrepancy which is
the cornerstone of the employer's factual predicate.

148. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
149. Id. at 239-42, 246.
150. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277 (plurality opinion); id. at 290 (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part and in the judgment).
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adopted by the Jackson School Board was the absence of statistics in
the poorly constructed record showing any significant disparity between the percentage of minority teachers hired and the percentage
available in the relevant labor pool. 151 The Court could not have approved the minority-student population as a baseline without undermining Hazelwood. Furthermore, approval of any baseline beyond
that of the "qualified" labor pool would have resulted in an unprecedented backlash against race/gender-conscious plans. 152
Stated bluntly, as a political matter, the Court would have
struck a frightful blow against the equal achievement construct had
it not adhered to the equal access construct in Wygant by insisting
upon strict application of Hazelwood's rule of refined baseline statistics for jobs involving specialized skills.
2. Public Contracting With the Federal Government: Fullilove
The Court's use of statistics as a tool for advancing the equal
achievement construct is not confined to cases involving employment.
In Fullilove v. Kluznick,15 3 the Court considered the constitutionality of a Congressionally mandated affirmative action plan specifically
requiring race-conscious preferences in a narrow category of federal
contracts. That case arose out of the Public Work's Employment Act
of 1977 (PWEA) in which Congress appropriated four billion dollars
for federal grants to state and local governments for the construction
of local public works projects.'" The primary goal of the legislation
was to stimulate the stagnant economy and the mordant construction
industry by a one-time infusion of major funding. 55 Section
103(f)(2) of the PWEA required that "at least ten percent of the
amount of each grant shall be expended for minority business enter151.

Id. at 277-78.

152. To begin with, education is always a sensitive issue. Questions involving the integration of pupils, teachers, administrators, and facilities have often triggered deep seated emo-

tional and political rifts in communities. They are volatile topics. Moreover, lurking in the
subtext of almost all debates over the merits of affirmative action plans is the charge that the
beneficiaries of race/gender-conscious preferences are minimally qualified or unqualified. This
charge would have surfaced with a vengeance and wrenched communities if the Court had
chosen general statistics rather than refined ones.
153. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
154.

Pub. L. No. 95-28, tit. I, § 103, 91 Stat. 116 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C.

§ 6705(f)(2) (1982)). The PWEA defined "minority business enterprise" as "a business at
least 50 per centum of which is owned by minority groups members or, in case of a publicly
owned business, at least 51 per centum of the stock of which is owned by minority group
members." Id. To benefit from the set-aside an individual had to be a citizen and be Negro,
Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo or Aleut. Id.

155.

See Days, Fullilove, 96 Yale L.J. 453, 467-68 (1987).
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prises" (MBEs). 156 The language adding the MBE requirement was
inserted into the statute as a result of an amendment from the floor
of the House. There was no legislative history to explain the need for
'the set-aside, the selection of the 10% figure, or the choice of the
1 57
beneficiaries.
Six Justices voted to uphold the program. There was, however,
no majority opinion. Even though they could not agree on a common
set of legal principles, the six Justices uniformly preferred a statistical analysis which favored the equal achievement construct. For example, Chief Justice Burger's opinion, in which Justices Powell and
White joined, frequently cited Congressional and executive branch
studies revealing the very low percentage of public contracts
awarded to MBEs in comparison to the percentage of minorities in
the nation's population.1 5 8 Justice Powell commented similarly in a
separate concurring opinion. 15 9 By emphasizing the very small percentage of the total funds expended in the United States for construction projects that the 10% set-aside affected, he added a second
dimension to the Court's statistical analysis which also endorsed the
equal achievement construct.1 60 Justices Marshall, Brennan, and
Blackmun made a similar observation.1 6
Displaying great deference to Congress, the six-Justice majority
examined Congress' choice of the ten percent figure uncritically. For
example, the Court compared minority and non-minority business
enterprises using general population figures; it never compared the
10 % figure to the percentage of MBEs in the United States; it never
discussed how the concentration of MBEs in certain areas of the
country, and their absence in others,,would effect the 10% requirement in each state. In short, the Court's endorsement of the 10%
figure promoted the equal achievement construct over that of equal
access in precisely the same way as its endorsement of general population statistics in Weber and Johnson.
156.

Pub. L. No. 95-28, tit. I, § 103, 91 Stat. 116 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C.

§ 6705(0(2) (1982)).
157. See Days, supra note 155.
158. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 459, 463-67 (Burger, C.J.)..
159. Id. at 503-06 (Powell, J.).
160. Id. at 514-15.
161. Id. at 521 (Marshall, J.).
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C. The 1988 Term: The Rehnquist Court's Transformation of
the Hazelwood Formulafrom an Equal Achievement Construct
into an Equal Access Construct
The looseness with which the Court applied Hazelwood's
formula for baseline comparisons ended abruptly with the 1988
Term. In two critical cases, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson'1 2 and
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,163 a majority of the Justices displayed a decided preference for a stricter application of Hazelwood.
By making it far more difficult, if not impossible, for public employers and contracting officials to rely on general population statistics,
the Court restricted the use of race-conscious plans almost as effectively as if it had banned them entirely. Precisely how the Court
emasculated Weber, Johnson, and Fullilove without overruling them
is described below.
1. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.
The history which led up to the adoption of the challenged setaside program in City of Richmond reflects the general pattern of
race relations in many southern cities. The former capital of the
Confederacy, Richmond, Virginia, greeted Brown v. Board of Education16 4 and its progeny with hostility and avoidance. It took many
years and lengthy court battles before the Richmond government
recognized that segregation in education, housing, and public recreation facilities was no longer tolerable. Until black voting strength
threatened their control of the City's government, Richmond's white
citizens lived, peaceably, if not contentedly, with integration. Race
became a contentious issue in Richmond again when the city sought
to annex adjacent white boroughs to assure a white voting majority.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court rebuffed that attempt, and more
blacks than whites were elected to the City Council.16 5
Familiar with the discrimination in Richmond, the black-dominated City Council held several days of public hearings examining
Richmond's public contracting policies and procedures. What it discovered was hardly startling. Although blacks compromised fifty per162.
163.

488 U.S. 469 (1989).
109 S.Ct. 2115 (1989).

164. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
165. City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975). For the troubled history
of Richmond's efforts to comply with Brown v. Board of Education, see Bradley v. School Bd.
of City of Richmond, Va., 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), af/'d by an equally divided Court,
412 U.S. 92 (1973).
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cent (50 %) of the general population, black-owned business received
only .67 % of the City's public contracts. Furthermore, at the pu~blic
hearings, there was testimony indicating how discrimination permeated both the nation's and Richmond's construction industry and
how the local contractors' associations, in which members solicited
for new business opportunities, were overwhelmingly white.1"6
Casting about for a solution to the history of exclusion, the City
Council adopted an MBE program modeled after the federal setaside program approved in Fullilove. The critical statistic which motivated the Richmond City Council to adopt the MBE program was
not very different from that which motivated Congress. In the five
years prior to the program's adoption, MBEs had won only .67% of
the contracts awarded by Richmond. A federal study, of which Congress was aware, showed that MBEs received67only .65 % of the gross
receipts realized by businesses nation-wide.1
The program's definition of an MBE and its selection of favored
groups mirrored the federal statute. The only significant difference
between the two plans was that Congress adopted a 10% figure,
halfway between the percentage of minority contractors and the percentage of minorities in the general population; the Richmond City
Council adopted a 30% figure, which was slightly more than halfway between the percentage of local minority contractors and the
percentage of minorities in Richmond.168
The J.A. Croson Company, controlled by non-minority entrepreneurs, challenged the Richmond set-aside program after the City
rejected its bid on a prison construction project because it had not
complied with the set-aside requirement. Distinguishing Fullilove on
several different grounds, the majority opinion in City of Richmond
seized upon the statistical disparity which prompted the Richmond
City Council to enact the MBE provision in the first place. Upon
invoking the Hazelwood formula, the Court found the set-aside program fatally flawed because it rested on a comparison between the
percentage of minorities in the general population (50%) and the
percentage of contracts let to MBEs (.67%). Insisting that the appropriate comparison was between the percentage of local MBEs and
the percentage of contracts let to them, the Court flatly rejected any
attempt to rely on general population statistics.16 9
166. City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 477-81; id. at 533-36 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
167. Fullilove v. Kluznick, 448 U.S. 448, 458-67 (1980); see also Days, supra note 155.
168. City of Richmond, 448 U.S. 448, 458-67 (1980)
169. Id. at 501-03.
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Literally reading Hazelwood, the Court declined to follow the
reasoning of Weber, Johnson, and Fullilove that encouraged the use
of general population figures. Johnson and Fullilove had avoided a
literal reading of Hazelwood by emphasizing that the jobs calling for
specialized skills were at the upper rungs of a career ladder whose
lower rungs required no special training. Weber looked to general
population figures because of the obvious political, educational, and
social barriers in the South which prevented blacks from entering
the skilled trades. The reasoning of these three cases clearly protected the City of Richmond's selection of the 30 % figure from constitutional invalidation. That the Court chose to ignore those cases in
favor of a rigid reading of Hazelwood starkly reveals its hostility to
the equal achievement construct and its preference for the equal access construct.
Two other portions of the Court's opinion also reflect that hostility. First, the majority went out of its way to question the premise
upon which Hazelwood rested, namely that there will be a fairly
direct relationship between the percentage of minorities in the general population and the percentage of minorities in each job category, trade, or profession. The majority found "'completely unrealistic' [the] assumption that minorities will choose a particular trade in
lockstep proportion to their representation in the general population.1 170 This questioning of Hazelwood can only further erode reliance upon the equal achievement construct. Second, the Court commented extensively on the City's failure to consider alternate, raceneutral devices for encouraging participation of MBEs in public contracting.1 71 By requiring that the City experiment with devices such
as modifying bonding requirements or offering special financial assistance to small businesses, the Court was expressing a classical view
of the equal access concept, one which sees the role of government as
removing barriers to competition, not rewriting the rules of the competition to give one competitor an advantage over the other.
2. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio
As discussed earlier, the Court originally crafted the Hazelwood
formula in the context of a Title VII liability case.17 2 It later incorporated that formula into its affirmative action jurisprudence as a
benchmark to measure the employer's factual predicate. Thus, the
170. Id. at 507.
171. Id. at 507-09.
172. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
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Court in Weber and Johnson spoke of a "conspicuous racial imbalance" and in Wygant it spoke of a "strong basis in evidence." 1 73 The
Hazelwood formula dictated the selection of the baseline measurement regardless of whether the plaintiff's reverse discrimination
claim alleged a violation of the Equal Protection Clause or Title VII.
In light of Hazelwood's dual character, the Supreme Court's
decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio17 4 takes on a heightened significance. Although that case involved the salmon canning
industry, whose employment demands are hardly typical of most
American industries, the Court nevertheless used Wards Cove Packing Co. to alter markedly the character of Title VII litigation in various ways that will affect labor practices in almost all industries
nation-wide. Two holdings are particularly important for the future
of affirmative action: The first deals with the selection of the appropriate baseline to conduct a race/gender-conscious work force comparison; the second deals with a requirement of specific causation,
linking the statistical disparity to specific employment practices.
a.

Identifying the Appropriate Labor Pool for Statistical
Comparison after Wards Cove Packing Co.

The plaintiffs in Wards Cove Packing Co. challenged the hiring
and promotion policies of two private sector employers who maintained salmon processing plants in remote areas of Alaska.17 Their
work force consisted of two separate categories of employees: unskilled workers who held "canning jobs" on the cannery line and
mostly skilled workers who held non-cannery jobs such as carpenters,
cooks, bookkeepers, machinists, engineers, and medical personnel.
Most of the unskilled workers were Filipinos hired through a longshoremen's union and Native Americans who lived in remote villages
near the canning plants. The skilled workers were mostly white and
hired in the continental United States through word-of-mouth recruitment and nepotism.

76

The linchpin to the plaintiffs' Title VII disparate impact case
was the stark statistical disparity between the low percentage of minorities holding skilled non-cannery jobs and the high percentage of
minorities holding unskilled cannery jobs. A five-Justice majority
severed the linchpin, relying principally on Hazelwood. The majority
173. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
174. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
175.

Id. at 2119-20.

176. Id.
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objected to the lump sum approach in which the two groups of jobs
were compared. Pointing out that the non-cannery jobs included
electricians, doctors, boat captains, and accountants, the majority
Viewed a comparison between the percentage of minorities filling
such jobs and the percentage of minorities filling cannery jobs as
"nonsensical. 11 The Court insisted that the proper comparison for
a prima facie disparate impact was the percentage of qualified minority workers in the relevant labor market.1 78

Wards Cove Packing Co., in a hammerjack fashion, repeated
the message of City of Richmond decided only a few months earlier:
employers must read Hazelwood literally. The only appropriate comparison is between the racial composition of the employer's work
force and the racial composition of the local labor pool of qualified
applicants.
Precisely how Wards Cove Packing Co. and City of Richmond
will affect an employer's decision to implement a race/gender-conscious hiring or promotion plan, either voluntarily or as part of a
consent judgment, is best illustrated by reconsidering the statistical
disparity in Weber and Johnson. In Weber, although the local labor
force was 39% black, only 15 % of the Kaiser work force was
black.1 9 Furthermore, almost all the blacks were concentrated in
low paying, unskilled jobs. The percentage of minorities holding
skilled jobs in the Kaiser plant was 1.83 % 180 Kaiser and the USWA

designed the 50/50 training program not from any benign motive to
assist the careers of unskilled workers, but to get more blacks into
skilled jobs so that the "gross disparity" would diminish and Kaiser
could retain its federal contracts. That disparity was predicated on
general population figures. The percentage of qualified minorities in
the local labor pool was approximately 4.3 %. Had Kaiser looked to
the latter figure, the "conspicuous racial imbalance" in its work
force would have disappeared. In Johnson, there were no women
among the 238 skilled trades workers employed by the Transportation Agency, although the local labor force pool was 36.4% female.
While it is unclear whether those statistics alone would have assured
the Transportation Agency's Title VII liability, they would certainly
have channeled the litigation in a different direction. Here the appli177.

Id. at 2122.

178.

Id. at 2121-24.

179.
curring).
180.

United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 210 (1979)

(Blackmun, J., con-

Id. at 198.
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cation of Wards Cove Packing Co. would have inhibited, if not entirely immobilized, the employer's decision-making process.
The Court was quite explicit in Wards Cove Packing Co. as to
the policy concern prompting its strict application of the Hazelwood
formula. The Court reasoned that without such a limitation, an employer whose work force was racially skewed ran the risk of a Title
VII lawsuit regardless of its responsibility for the disproportionate
racial or gender makeup of its work force. The vissitudes associated
with such a risk (e.g., lengthy litigation, detailed discovery, redirection of the attention of executive management away from strictly
business matters, substantial attorneys' fees, etc.) would undoubtedly
lead many employers to adopt sub silentio a system of race/gender
based quotas. The Court feared affirmative action plans would become a subterfuge to mask the distribution of employment benefits
along racial/gender lines.
In articulating this concern, the Court implicitly acknowledged
the hidden fear omnipresent in the equal access/equal achievement
debate. In its purest form, equal achievement calls for the bestowal
of "catch up" points for minorities and women still suffering from
the legacy of Jim Crowism and sexism. As society progresses in
eradicating racial and gender discrimination and stereotyping, the
need for those "catch up" points will diminish. Many critics charge,
however, that society will ultimately become less willing to tackle the
herculean task of eradicating racism and sexism if minorities and
women are guaranteed a "share of the pie" in the guise of "catch
up" points. These critics insist that equal access is the only construct
certain to avoid the pitfall of perpetual, forced distribution of economic benefits. The Government should remove barriers. It should
not give a boost over them.
b.

Specific Causation and Statistical Disparity

To date, most of the Court's affirmative action jurisprudence
has focused either on the factual predicate which led to the plan's
adoption or on the effect of the preferences on "innocent" non-minority employees. Wards Cove Packing Co. suggests that a third factor is about to enter the analysis: specific causation. There is an intimate, organic relationship between the principles invoked to test an
employer's liability under Title VII and those invoked to test an employer's right to implement a race/gender-conscious program. The
flip-side of Hazelwood's liability rule of "evidence of longlasting and
gross disparity between the [racial and ethnic] composition of a work
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force and that of the general population" is Weber's "manifest imbalance" and Wygant's "strong basis in evidence." When the Court
recasts the statistical formulae measuring disparities for liability
purposes, those decisions necessarily impact upon its affirmative action jurisprudence.
Causation is also a "flip-side" concept. In cases challenging
race/gender-conscious preferences, the Court has stopped short of
demanding an explicit admission of discrimination by the employer
or public contracting official. It reasoned that requiring such an admission would bring voluntary remedial reforms to a grinding halt
because the admission would then become the basis for a lawsuit by
minority employees and applicants. At the other end of the spectrum, the Court has cautioned the lower courts against accepting an
admission of discrimination, fearful that it would be the product of
political capitulation to minority pressure groups.""1 Accordingly, the
Court has attempted to strike a balance between the two extremes
by imposing the requirement of a factual predicate.
The Court devoted a substantial part of its analysis of the
"compelling interest" prong of the strict scrutiny test in City of
Richmond to showing the absence of sufficient proof of the factual
predicate. 2 The Court's decision in Wards Cove, a Title VII liability case, reflects an identical concern. In Wards Cove, the Court held
that the showing of a statistical disparity was only one part in the
unfolding of the employee's burden of proof. It characterized a
showing of causation as an "integral part" of the plaintiff's burden.183 The "plaintiff must demonstrate that it is the application of a
specific or particular employment practice that has created the dis184
parate impact under attack."
By emphasizing the causal link between the employer's employment practices and the statistical disparity, the Court has sent a
clear signal of its disfavor of Title VII claims. By making it more
difficult for Title VII plaintiffs to prove their case, the Court has
channeled its jurisprudence away from the equal achievement construct.185 The message the Court is sending is that equal access, as
181.

City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 526-28 (1989) (citing Wein-

berger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n.16 (1975)).
182.

See supra notes 165-71 and accompanying text.

183. Wards Cove Packing Co., 109 S. Ct. at 2124 (1989).
184. Id.
185. Similarly, by specifically making disparate impact cases more difficult, the Court
has impeded the equal access construct insofar as it motivated the decision in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1990

45

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 4 [1990], Art. 4

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:1057

manifested by the disparate treatment theory of liability, is the only
construct which merits the Court's endorsement. The emphasis on
causation in Wards Cove manifests the same judicial philosophy as
the emphasis on the factual predicate in City of Richmond.
Furthermore, to the extent the Court places a greater burden on
plaintiffs in proving liability, it correspondingly diminishes the incentive for employers to consider the need for race/gender-conscious
plans. Why should an employer bother to conduct the rigorous analysis called for in establishing a "manifest imbalance" or a "strong
basis in evidence," run the risk of disgruntling its non-minority employees, and open itself to a reverse discrimination suit, if the likelihood of a Title VII suit by its minority employees is reduced significantly by the heavy burden placed on plaintiffs?
The degree to which the Court wanted to reduce the incentive,
moreover, is apparent from the Court's final observations in Wards
Cove. The Court placed a third hurdle in plaintiffs' paths by holding
that even if they showed both statistical imbalance and causation,
the employer could still avoid liability by "producing evidence of a
business justification for his employment practice.1 186 The opinion,

furthermore, made quite clear that all the employer had to do was
produce such evidence; "[ihe burden of persuasion . . . remains
with the disparate-impact plaintiff."1 87 How the Court characterized

the evidence of business justification is also revealing:. "[T]here is no
requirement that the challenged practice be 'essential' or 'indispensable' to the employer's business for it to pass muster ....,188

Given the "flip-side" relationship between Title VII liability
principles and the principles governing an employer's decision to implement race/gender-conscious preferences, the Court's harsh approach to the causation issue in Wards Cove clearly signals an even
greater reluctance to approve affirmative action plans containing
such preferences. It is not difficult to envision the Court demanding
proof of causation from employers in addition to the necessary statistical disparity. It is only a matter of time before non-minority employees will expand their challenges to race/gender-conscious plans
to include issues relating to causation and business justification. The
likelihood of such issues being raised constitutes a further disincentive to include race/gender-conscious preferences in the first place.
Whether viewed directly as a liability case or indirectly as a "flip186. Wards Cove Packing Co., 109 S. Ct. at 2126.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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side" affirmative action case, Wards Cove sends a powerful message
of disapproval of the equal achievement construct by the Rehnquist
Court.
III.

THE HIDDEN SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
IN THE EQUAL ACcEss/EQUAL ACHIEVEMENT DEBATE

Over the past fifty years, the Court has articulated three standards of review in deciding Equal Protection Clause challenges to
government action. The Court uses the rational basis test in reviewing claims of an economic, social, or welfare character. This test is
the most deferential to government and requires only that the state
demonstrate a legitimate end and that the means be rationally related to that end. Its application rarely invalidates the government's
challenged action.18 9 The Court subjects classifications involving gender, alienage, or illegitimacy to the intermediate test.190 More demanding than the rational basis test it requires an important governmental objective and substantially related means. The outcome of its
application is uncertain in part because of the elasticity and openended nature of its formulation. Harshest of all the standards is the
strict scrutiny test, which calls for a compelling interest and narrowly tailored means. 191 Labelled "'strict' in theory and fatal in
fact" by Professor Gunther, because it is nearly impossible to satisfy,
the Court's decision to apply the strict scrutiny test signals a certain
constitutional death knell. 92 It is the test traditionally invoked to
review legislation hostile to racial minorities. The only legislation to
survive this test in the last half century involved the Japanese internment statutes, legislation almost surely unconstitutional under cur189. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also
Bankers Life Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988) (upholding Mississippi penalty
statute which required money judgments from unsuccessful appellants where statute was reasonably tailored to achieve the state's legitimate objection of detering frivolous appeals);
Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340 (1986) (upholding certain provisions of the Social Security Act
which treated surviving divorced spouses and widowed spouses differently for benefit purposes
where it was rational for Congress to make the distinctions based upon levels of dependency);
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (applying the rational relationship test to state actions and policies affecting the mentally retarded).
190. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988) (illegitimacy); Pickett v. Brown, 462
U.S. 1 (1983) (illegitimacy); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982)
(gender); Phyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (alienage); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91
(1982) (illegitimacy); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (gender).
191. E.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
11 (1967).
192. Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. Rav. 1, 8 (1972).
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rent strict scrutiny formulation.19 3
While it has long been true that government action which burdened minorities was subject to the strict scrutiny test, until the
Court's decision in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. in the 1988
Term, it was an open question whether that standard applied to government action benefitting minorities ("benign discrimination").
City of Richmond resolved the issue in favor of the strict scrutiny
test. Its selection, just like the Court's insistence on the rigid reading
of Hazelwood,194 represents a clear preference by a majority of the
Justices for the limited construct of equal access. City of Richmond
represents a rejection of the Court's previous equal achievement approach articulated in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke 9 5 and Fullilove v. Klutznick.1 96
The Court's initial consideration of which standard of review to
apply took place in Bakke. The resulting decision - characterized
by block voting, multiple lengthy opinions, and a "swing" vote presaged most of the Court's subsequent affirmative action decisions.
Bakke arose out of the California Board of Regents' decision to set
aside sixteen out of 100 seats exclusively for minority applicants for
admission to the medical school at Davis. A special admissions committee admitted several minority applicants whose college grade
point averages and medical school boards were lower than those of
Mr. Bakke, a white male. 9 7
Four Justices, the so-called "Stevens" group, voted to strike
down the Davis plan on statutory grounds, concluding it violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.198 These Justices never
reached the constitutional issue. The four Justices in the "Brennan"
group concluded the Davis set-aside was not prohibited by Title
VII. 1 99 Accordingly, they reached Bakke's equal protection claim.
193. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
194. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
195. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
196. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
197. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 272-77 (Powell, J.).
198. Id. at 408-420 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part). Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252 (1964)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982)) provides that, "[n]o person in the United States shall,
on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
199. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324-56 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
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They rejected it, finding no constitutional flaw in the program. In
their view, a state's decision to benefit a racial minority and impose
a corresponding disability on the white majority was substantially
different from a decision by a white majority to disadvantage the
minority. Because the decision's character favored rather than dis200
abled the minority, they rejected the strict scrutiny test.
The Brennan group's rejection of the strict scrutiny test did not,
however, lead it to embrace the rational basis test. Suspicious of any
use of race as a determinant by the state, it favored application of
the intermediate test: the state would have to show that the conferring of the benefit served an important governmental objective and
that the means (i.e., the racial classification) was substantially related to this objective. Given this standard, the Justices in the Brennan group had little difficulty accepting the Davis set-aside. In their
judgment, Davis' justification for the set-aside was more than adequate. Davis' justification rested exclusively on the equal achievement construct. Minority applicants needed catch-up points in the
race for economic security and social status represented by participation in the medical profession. The equal achievement construct justified the set-aside as necessary to compensate for past societal discrimination, to assist minorities in entering the medical profession
which had for so long excluded them, to create a cadre of minority
physicians who would bring their skills to minority communities, and
to foster a racially diverse student body.2" 1
Ultimately, the Davis program floundered because the Brennan
group could not gain a fifth vote. Justice Powell declined to join either the Brennan or Stevens group because he disagreed with their
reasoning. In particular, he rejected the Brennan group's advocacy of
the intermediate test. Assailing any government decision based on
race -

whether hostile or benign

-

as pernicious, he invoked the

strict scrutiny test. 2 Of the various equal achievement rationales
advanced by Davis to justify the program, he accepted only one, the
need for diversity in the student body, as sufficiently compelling to
pass constitutional muster.203 Nevertheless, the Davis program did

not survive. In his view, the exclusive setting aside of the sixteen
seats was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to satisfy the second
200.
part).
201.
202.
203.

Id. at 359-62 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
Id. at 362.
Id. at 289-91 (Powell, J.).
Id. at 311-15.
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prong of the strict scrutiny test.'"
Although Justice Powell was not willing to go so far as the Justices in the Brennan group, the equal achievement construct still
emerged the victor in Bakke. Government could give catch-up credit,
"pluses," to minorities to assist them in competing for government
benefits. The Equal Protection Clause did not require government to
judge the qualifications of minority applicants with precisely the
same criteria used for non-minorities.
The Court's subsequent decision in Fullilove v. Klutznick reaffirmed this victory. As discussed earlier, Fullilove involved a Congressionally enacted, ten percent set-aside for MBEs.2 5 While five
Justices in Bakke approved the use of race as a "plus," six Justices
in Fullilove approved an almost absolute ten percent set-aside based
on race. The equal achievement construct had clearly triumphed
over the equal access construct.
That victory was short lived, however. It ended with the Court's
decision in City of Richmond. The impact of that case, moreover,
reaches well beyond the mere designation of the strict scrutiny test.
Even more important is how rigorously the Court interpreted the
"purpose" and the "means" prong of the test, bearing testimony to
Professor Gunther's characterization, "'strict' in theory and fatal in
fact."206 Its interpretation marks a clear turning away from the
equal achievement construct toward the equal access construct.A.

The Purpose Prong -

Whose Purpose?

One of the sub-issues buried in Bakke was the constitutional
competence of the Board of Regents to adopt the race-conscious admissions program. The Justices in the Brennan group had little difficulty with the sub-issue because they saw the setting aside of the
sixteen seats as an educational decision.207 Justice Powell found it
more troublesome, characterizing the Board of Regents' "broad mission (as] education, not the formulation of any legislative policy or
the adjudication of particular claims of illegality."2 '
In Fullilove, Congress enacted the MBE program relying on a
204.
205.
206.
207.
dissenting
208.

Id. at 315-20.
See supra notes 153-61 and accompanying text.
Gunther, supra note 191, at 8.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 362-69 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
in part).
Id. at 309 (Powell, J.).
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panapoly of enumerated powers: the Commerce Clause, °9 the Taxing and Spending Clause, 210 and Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 21 Regardless of their division on other matters, the six
Justices who voted in favor of the constitutionality of the MBE program uniformly agreed that their decision was heavily influenced by
the identity of the legislating body. 2 Given the broad mission of
Congress to correct malfunctioning of the social order on a nationwide basis, these six Justices found no constitutional impairment, in
. the absence of specific attribution of fault by Congress to the federal
government, for the dismal participation of MBEs in public works
contracting. In an extraordinary display of deference to Congress,
the Court relied on a plethora of government studies clearly documenting the exclusion of minorities from the federal contracting system.213 Missing from those studies was any attribution of government responsibility for the exclusion. Nonetheless, the Court gave its
constitutional blessing to Congress' purpose of eradicating
discrimination.
Subsequent to Fullilove, many states and municipalities
adopted set-aside programs modeled after the federal one.214 For the
most part, the lower courts brushed aside objections to these programs based on the non-federal character of the enacting
legislature.215
City of Richmond effectively overturned these post-Fullilove
lower court decisions. The reasons which led the Court to treat municipal and state MBE programs differently from the Congressional
set-aside are fairly clear. 16 Justice O'Connor's opinion drew a sharp
209.

U.S. CONST. art. I,

§ 8, cl. 3.

210.

U.S. CONST. art. I,

§

211.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.

212.

Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 473-80 (Burger, C.J.); id. at 499-502 (Powell, J., concur-

8, cl. 1.

ring); id. at 517-21 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
213. Id. at 477-78.
214. E.g., South Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County, Fla., 723 F.2d 846 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 871 (1984);
Schmidt v. Oakland Unified School Dist., 662 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1981), vacated and re-

manded, 457 U.S. 594 (1982); Pettinaro Constr. Co. v. Delaware Auth. for Regional Transit,
500 F. Supp. 559 (D. Del. 1980); Arrington v. Associated Gen. Contractors, 403 So. 2d 893

(Ala. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 913 (1982); Southwest Wash. Chapter, Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Pierce County, 100 Wash. 2d 109, 667 P.2d 1092 (1983).

215. See generally Note, Principles of Competence: The Ability of Public Institutions
to Adopt Remedial Affirmative Action Plans, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 581 (1986) (authored by

Mark S. Kende) (discussing when it is proper for a court to accept a public body's claim that a
race-conscious plan serves the government's interest in remedying past discrimination).
216. Only Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White joined in Part II of Justice
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distinction between the powers of Congress to remedy discrimination
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the constitutional ability of the states to remedy discrimination.217 Literally interpreting the history of the Fourteenth Amendment, she insisted
that the drafters were suspicious of all state decision-making based
on race. Her opinion refused to accord states and municipalities the
deference given Congress in Fullilove.
In selecting the strict scrutiny standard of review and applying
it so rigorously to municipal legislation, the Court has sent an unmistakable signal that race-conscious preferences are rarely acceptable
except as Congressionally mandated. In the grand debate between
Professors Bickel and Ely,21 Professor Bickel's views have obviously
prevailed. It is unfortunate, however, that the debate's resolution occurred in a factual setting in which the richness of Ely's position
could not be fully appreciated. Ely justified a less than strict standard of review on the white majority's imposition of a burden on
O'Connor's opinion which analyzed the authority of the states to adopt race-conscious legislation. Justice Scalia's opinion concurring in the judgment endorses Part II's reasoning. City of
Richmond, 488 U.S. at 520-23 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Thus, at least four
solid votes exist to support Justice O'Connor's rationale for treating state and municipal MBE
programs more harshly than the federal program in Fullilove. While Justice Kennedy expressly found Part II "both precise and fair," he refused to join it because "[t]he Fourteenth
Amendment ought not to be interpreted to reduce a State's authority ....
Id. at 518 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). The actual significance of his
refusal is de minimus, however. He vigorously supported the use of the strict scrutiny test
because it "will operate in a manner generally consistent with the imperative of race neutrality, because it forbids the use even of narrowly drawn racial classifications except as a last
resort." Id.
217. E.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
Recently, the Supreme Court decided Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 58 U.S.L.W.
5053 (U.S. June 27, 1990). In that case, the Court rejected an equal protection challenge to
two minority preference programs adopted by the FCC. Relying on Fullilove, a five Justice
majority found the race-conscious programs constitutional because they "have been specifically
approved-indeed, mandated by Congress." Id. at 5057. The most startling aspect of the
Court's decision is its endorsement of the intermediate test in reviewing race-conscious programs adopted by Congress. Id. Barely a year before in City of Richmond a majority of the
Justices had adopted the strict scrutiny test in reviewing a municipal MBE program. Nothing
in City of Richmond suggested that the Court's adoption of the strict scrutiny test was not an
across-the-board determination applicable to all race-conscious programs -regardless of the
state or federal character of the implementing organ of government. Coalescing majority support for applying the intermediate test to congressionally approved programs must have
brought great personal satisfaction to Justice Brennan. Commencing with Bakke, the very first
affirmative action case to the reach the Court, Justice Brennan had consistently argued that a
less vigorous standard of review ought to be applied to government action intended to benefit
minorities, not disadvantage them. Metro Broadcastingis the last opinion he wrote prior to his
resignation.
218. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
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itself.219 The set-aside plan in the City of Richmond case, however,
was enacted by a city council, the majority of whose members were
not white. Thus, on one level, the set-aside can be read as a preference favoring the racial majority (blacks) and disfavoring the racial
minority (whites). Justice O'Connor obviously read the plan this
way. She attempted to hoist proponents of Ely's views on their champion's own petard by quoting Ely: "Of course it works both ways: a
law that favors Blacks over Whites would be220suspect if it were enacted by a predominantly Black legislature."
O'Connor's reading is obviously one dimensional and is fatally
flawed by its disregard of the nation's history of racism. 221 Blacks in
Richmond suffered over two hundred and twenty-five years of slavery. Whites completely dominated the City's superstructure from after the Civil War until the middle of the 1980s. They controlled
housing, education, and economic opportunity. It is the height of absurdity to label the decision of the first black Richmond City Council "suspect" when it merely adapted a Congressionally created,
Court-approved scheme to lessen the vestiges of pervasive discrimination. Had the City of Richmond Court been as concerned with
racial justice as it purported to be with the constitutional guarantee
of equal protection, it would not have applied the strict scrutiny test
to begin with. Had it been seeking only to constitutionally enshrine
Ely's view it would have limited strict scrutiny review to legislation
enacted to benefit majority group members or burden non-majority
group members. It would have reserved for another day the very distinct issue of which standard of review to apply when a majority
group voluntarily disadvantages itself to benefit an historically illtreated and abused minority. This resolution, which would have resulted in the invalidation of the Richmond set-aside would have been
consistent with Ely's views. Instead, the Court chose to render a "political" decision, jeopardizing tens of thousands of affirmative action
plans nationwide.
The factual setting of City of Richmond, moreover, was an
anomaly. Blacks have gained political control over very few municipal and city governments. Furthermore, there is no "minority" ma219.

See supra note 27 and accompanying text.

220. City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 495-96 (quoting Ely, The Constitutionalityof Reverse Racial Discrimination,41 U. Cu. L. Rav. 723, 739 n.58 (1974)).

221.

For a moving personal criticism of the majority opinion's refusal to contextualize

the racism leading to the adoption of the Richmond program, see Williams, The Obliging
Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal Opportunity, 87 Mica. L. REv.2128 (1989).
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jority in any state legislature. The overwhelming majority of setaside programs are adopted by legislatures with "non-minority" majorities that have recognized the importance of minority entreprenual
success to economic, political and social integration. In other words,
the democratic process has freely accepted the equal achievement
construct over the equal access construct. In interfering with the
democratic process the Court emulates its predecessor that decided
Lochner v. New York.222 It hides its political preferences behind the
rhetoric of equal protection, just as the Lochner Court hid its laissez-faire theory of the market place behind the rhetoric of liberty of
contract.
B.

The Purpose Prong -

What Purpose?

City of Richmond is important in another respect as well. Unlike the standard-of-review holding just discussed, however, this part
of the Court's opinion is befuddled by poorly selected language and
hazy conceptualization. As noted earlier, Bakke stands for the general proposition that preferences based on race are constitutionally
tolerabfe if used to promote ethnic diversity in a student body.22
Fullilove stands for the proposition that Congress can employ raceconscious preferences to eradicate pervasive discrimination in public
22 4
contracting. In contrast, Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,
stands for the proposition that the state may not act to remedy societal discrimination. The Court criticized such action for having "no
logical stopping point" and for being "too amophorous," "insuffi2 25
cient," and "overexpansive."
Without altering any of these propositions, City of Richmond
injects a hybrid concept - identified discrimination. The concept of
222. 198 U.s. 45 (1905).
223. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
224. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
225. Id. at 275-76 (Powell, J., plurality opinion). There was no majority opinion in Wygant. The quoted langauge is found in Justice Powell's plurality opinion in which Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined. Justice White concurred only in the judgment. He
viewed the school board's layoff provisions which retained newly hired minority teachers at the
expense of more senior white employees as the equivalent of firing whites to hire blacks, clearly
an equal protection clause violation. Id. at 294-95 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). A
very definite shift has occurred in Justice White's affirmative action views in the eleven years
since he joined the Brennan group in Bakke which approved of government action to remedy
societal discrimination. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 362-73 (Brennan, J.); Daly, supra note 6, at
58-61. The proposition that government is powerless to remedy societal discrimination most
likely commands Justice White's vote as well, creating a five-Justice majority for this
proposition.
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identified discrimination suggests the existence of a spectrum of acts
which have impeded the access of minorities to jobs and education.
At one end lies societal discrimination which government is powerless to remedy because of its amorphous character. At the other lies
government-imposed discrimination which the state is obligated to
remedy. Past the middle mark on the government-imposed side is
identified discrimination. It consists of government activities which
perpetuate private acts of discrimination and is, therefore, more
specific in character than societal discrimination. Thus, Justice
O'Connor writes:
[I]f the city could show that it had essentially become a "passive
participant" in a system of racial exclusion practiced by elements
of the local construction industry, we think it clear that the city
could take affirmative steps to dismantle such a system. It is beyond dispute that any public entity, state or federal, has a compelling interest in assuring that public dollars, drawn from tax contributions of226all citizens, do not serve to finance the evil of private
prejudice.

On first view, identified discrimination appears to reflect the
equal achievement construct. The government is constitutionally free
to prefer contractors of one race over those of another race to make
up for the years the disadvantaged group was excluded from the economic opportunity represented by public contracts. The government
need not confine its efforts simply to removing barriers. Although the
concept of identified discrimination in theory reflects the equal
achievement construct, examination of the remainder of the opinion
in City of Richmond proves identified discrimination an unworkable
concept, masking the Court's preference for the equal access
construct.227
226.

City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 492.

227. The origin of the term "identified discrimination" is obscure. Justice Powell used it
twice without elaboration first in Bakke and later in Fullilove. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 (Pow-

concurring). Its elusive quality is well
ell, J.); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 497, 503-06 (Powell, J.,
illustrated by one prominent district court case. In South Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen.
Contractors, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 552 F. Supp. 909 (S.D. Fla. 1982), affd in
part and rev'd in part, 723 F.2d 846 (1lth Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 871 (1984), the district court found that although "societal discrimination" might be responsible for the low percentage of black contracting, "identified discrimination" also caused their exclusion from public contracting. Id. at 925-26. The district court nowhere defined the term, and it is difficult to
see how the "identified discrimination" is any different from the societal discrimination.
The City of Richmond pressed the concept of identified discrimination in its brief to the
Supreme Court. A student commentator has also argued its relevancy. Note, The'Nonperpetuation of Discriminationin Public Contracting:A Justificationfor State and Local Minority
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While the introduction of such an undefined concept would be
disturbing in and of itself, the actual character and extent of the
proof offered in City of Richmond renders its introduction even more
problematic. In enacting the federal MBE program, Congress was
acutely conscious of the racial apartheid characterizing the construction industry. In Weber, the Court itself commented upon the virtual
exclusion of minority workers from skilled trades unions. Indeed, the
Court approved of "judicial notice" of the systemic discrimination.22
Excluded from construction jobs through direct employment because
of contractors' prejudices, denied entry into the craft trades by biased unions, and offered minimal vocational training in substandard
public schools, minorities were highly unlikely to end up as entrepreneurs in the construction industry. Despite the abundance of Congressional studies, private reports, and judicial opinions attesting to
the dismal record of minority access to the skills predicate to entrepreneurial endeavors, the majority opinion in City of Richmond
found no record of discrimination sufficiently "identified" to satisfy
the purpose prong of the strict scrutiny test.229 In light of the data
reflected in the record and the information abundantly available in a
form appropriate for judicial notice, identified discrimination becomes an elusive - if not a meaningless - concept.
For two reasons, the exhortation for identified discrimination
places an almost insurmountable hurdle in a plaintiff's path. First,
the absence of a definition to give the term substantive content
means endless rounds of litigation in the district courts and the
courts of appeals. Second, it portends the introduction of still another bevy of experts, testifying in barely comprehensible professional jargon. Trial transcripts in employment discrimination cases
are already replete with the testimony of statistical experts opining
on multiple regression analysis, the chi square test, and binomial distribution. 23 To initiate or defend the standard disparate-impact class
Business Set-Asides After Wygant, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1797, 1804-08 (1988); see also Note,
supra note 215, at 604 n.103 (1986) (discussing the Court's treatment of the concept of societal discrimination).
The City invoked the concept to avoid triggering the "vague" and "amorphous" fears
which led to Wygant's condemnation of remediation of societal discrimination as an acceptable
predicate for affirmative action. Its strategy rested on showing that identified discrimination
was more like state-sponsored discrimination than societal discrimination because its origins,
structure, and effects were descriptive and quantifiable.
228. Weber, 443 U.S. at 198 n.1.
229.

City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 506.

230. See supra note 79.
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action, attorneys frequently must familiarize themselves with the
ponderous language and dense concepts of psychometricians. More
than one court has lamented that employment discrimination cases
now consist of one side's expert testifying in terms so obtuse that
only the other side's expert can understand them!2"' To this war of
experts, City of Richmond interjects still a new vocabulary: that of
the industrial sociologist. Part-historian, part-economist, part-statistician, this expert is trained to analyze racial and gender composition
of a given industry's work force and attribute whatever stratification
exists to specific employment practices, procedures, structures, patterns, or industry culture. In view of the doctrinal deformitities, evidentiary perplexities, and practical weaknesses associated with
"identified discrimination," it is difficult to fathom the reason why
the Court bestowed its constitutional blessing on the concept.232
C.

The Means Prong -

Race/Gender-ConsciousPreferences as
the Last Resort
Fashioning a constitutionally valid MBE program after City of
Richmond will not be easy. It is most unlikely that any race-conscious set-aside can be constitutionally valid without a detailed record of failed, ambitious, alternative remedies.233 The approach which
231. E.g., EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633, 645 (4th Cir. 1983), rev'd sub
nom. Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867 (1984); Otero v. Mesa County Valley
School Dist. No. 51, 470 F. Supp. 326, 331 n.2 (D. Colo. 1979), afid, 628 F.2d 1271 (10th
Cir. 1980).
232. The affirmative action jurisprudence of Justice O'Connor suggests an explanation.
While clearly not a moderate or centrist in the same vein as Justice Powell, Justice O'Connor
has not been an unwavering opponent of affirmative action. She is sympathetic to the goal of
bringing women and minorities into the mainstream of the American economy and accelerating their access to jobs and promotions from which they were formerly excluded. At the same
time, she is sensitive to the impact of racial preferences on innocent employees who share no
responsibility for the discrimination. In light of this tension, it is not surprising that in City of
Richmond she sought to carve out a middle road of sorts. This is entirely consistent with her
prior decisions in this area. In Wygant, for example, she very pointedly noted the possibility of
other compelling purposes which might satisfy the strict scrutiny test, such as assuring a diverse faculty in educational institutions. Her discomfort level with rigid formulations at the
expense of broader understanding is also well illustrated by her concurring opinion in Wygant.
It strove mightily to reconcile the diverse views of the splintered Court by identifying overarching principles accepted by proponents of both the strict scrutiny and intermediate standards. See Daly, supra note 6, at 72-78.
Undoubtedly prompted by a motive, similar to that of reconciliation, of looking to shared
concerns rather than divided interests in the Court's opinions, Justice O'Connor envisioned
identified discrimination as a bridge between irremedial societal discrimination and remedial
state-sponsored discrimination.
233., City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 506-08; id. at 525-28 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment). In insisting upon evidence of failed, alternative remedies, Justice O'Connor was
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holds the greatest promise involves the restructuring of government

assistance programs in a racially neutral way,, whereby the beneficiaries of government set-asides are businesses run by individuals defined by economic or cultural disadvantage rather than by race
(DBEs). While a substantial portion of the DBEs will be MBEs,

such a set-aside will not trigger strict scrutiny review. This too is an
equal achievement construct, but one that adds more runners to the
race. The establishment of DBE programs is the solution clearly
most favored by a majority of the Court.'
returning to a theme she first expressed in her dissenting opinion in United States v. Paradise,
480 U.S. 149 (1987). She declined to endorse the district court's 50/50 promotion quota because it was not "manifestly necessary" and because the district court did not "expressly evaluate the available alternative remedies." Id. at 197, 201 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Both Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined in that dissent. Justice White filed a separate
dissent in which he stated that he agreed "with much of what Justice O'Connor ha[d] written
...
" Id. at 196 (White, J., dissenting). Joined by Justice Kennedy, the four Paradise dissenters became the City of Richmond majority.
234. City of Richmond, 488 U.S. 508-10 (majority opinion); id. at 525-28 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Prior to City of Richmond, Congress had enacted several statutes
containing DBE provisions. For example, the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-424, 96 Stat. 2097 (1983), directs that not less than ten percent of the sum
appropriated "shall be expended with small business concerns owned and controlled by socially
and economically disadvantaged individuals . . . ." Id. § 105(0, 96 Stat. 2097, 21001. The
statute defines "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals" by reference to the definition of that term in section 8(d) of the Small Business Act. 15 U.S.C. § 637(d). That statute, in turn, provides that "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals" are presumed
to include (but are not limited to): "Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian-Pacific Americans, and other minorities .... ." 15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(3)(c) (1988).
The Department of Transportation has issued regulations containing a "rebuttable presumption" that Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian-Pacific
Americans and Asian-Indian Americans are "socially and economically disadvantaged." 49
C.F.R. § 23.62 (1989). In contrast, non-minority group members must be specifically designated socially and economically disadvantaged by the Small Business Administration in order
to qualify for the set-aside. 15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(3)(c).
The "rebuttable presumption" causes the Surface Transportation Assistance Act to resemble the absolute 10% set-aside approved in Fullilove. The resemblance is not surprising.
Representative Mitchell who sponsored the amendment to the PWEA containing the set-aside
also sponsored the 10% set-aside for "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals" in
the Surface Transportation Assistance Act. Representative Mitchell introduced both set-aside
provisions in the form of amendments from the floor of the House of Representatives: Fullilove
set-aside, 123 CONG. REc. 5097 (1977) (statement of Rep. Mitchell); Surface Transportation
Assistance Act, 128 CONG. REc. H8954 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1982). Both lack a traditionally
documented legislative history. Notably absent are committee reports and records of hearings
related to the amendments. See H.R. REP.No. 97-555, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1982
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3639; H.R. CONF. RPP. No. 97-987, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. Naws 3639.
Congress has used set-aside provisions in foreign aid legislation as well as domestic appropriations. E.g., Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, Pub. L. No. 98-151, 97 Stat. 964,
970-71 (1983). Congress continued the set-aside for fiscal year 1985. Pub. L. No. 98-473,
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From the Court's perspective, DBE legislation (provided it is
administered even-handedly) is the perfect solution because it eliminates the problems attendant with the strict scrutiny standard of review. With the racial preference removed, state and local set-asides
for disadvantaged individuals fall into the category of economic and
social welfare legislation. As noted earlier, such legislation is subject
only to the rational relationship/legitimate end test.2" 5
In conclusion, the Supreme Court's adoption of the strict scrutiny test can mean only one thing for ninety-nine percent of raceconscious preferences: their end. City of Richmond puts the purpose
and means of such preferences under microscopic judicial review.
Given the historical functioning of strict scrutiny analysis, it is
naively optimistic to conclude that the Court's decision merely calls
for "affirmative action programs [to] be carefully designed - not dismantled."2 6 Professor Rosenfeld is much closer to the mark when he
describes City of Richmond as striking "a major blow against longstanding, concerted efforts to narrow the economic gap between
black and white entrepreneurs. 2 37
From a doctrinal standpoint, the selection of the strict scrutiny
test reflects an important lesson often only fully understood by Court
aficionados: How the Court can rechannel an entire course of jurisprudence without overruling precedent. Simply by deciding an issue
left open in prior cases, the Court in City of Richmond tightly tied
the hands of state and local governments trying to rectify the years
of pervasive public and private prejudices. Furthermore, by its selection of the strict scrutiny test for equal protection review it has
cabined the power of state and local government employers under
Title VII. From now on, whenever such governments adopt race-conscious preferences, their implementation must serve a "compelling
purpose" and their structure must rest on narrowly tailored means.
§ 127, 98 Stat. 1884, 1891 (1984).
235. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
236. Joint Statement, ConstitutionalScholars' Statement on Affirmative Action After
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 98 YALE L.J. 1711, 1712 (1989).
237. Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action and the Elusive Meaning of
ConstitutionalEquality, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1729, 1731 (1989). Minority contractors and public officials agree with Professor Rosenfeld's conclusion. See Assessing Impact of Case on Race
Quotas, wall St. J., Jan. 25, 1989, at B1, col. 3; Greenhouse, Court Bars A Plan Set Up to
Provide Jobs to Minorities, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1989 at Al, col. 6. But see Fried, Affirmative Action After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.: A Response to the Scholars' Statement, 99 YALE L.J. 155 (1989) (disagreeing with the widely held belief that the City of Richmond decision adversely affected the viability of affirmative action).
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IV. THE REHNQUIST COURT'S ENCOURAGEMENT OF CHALLENGES
TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PLANS BY NON-MINORITY EMPLOYEES AS
A MANIFESTATION OF ITS PREFERENCE FOR THE EQUAL ACCESS
CONSTRUCT

The third case decided in the 1988 Term that manifests the
Rehnquist Court's preference for the equal access construct is Martin v. Wilks.2 38 In.that case, the Court made it easier for non-minority employees to challenge judgments or voluntary settlements incorporating race/gender-conscious preferences. The decision's effect is
certain to add to the list of imponderables which employers and the
courts must weigh before adopting affirmative action plans. By encouraging non-minority employees to bring such suits, Martin correspondingly discourages decision-makers from using such preferences.
Equal access thus becomes the safer course of action; equal achievement becomes the riskier.
Prior to Martin, most courts of appeals had adopted the doctrine of "impermissible collateral attack.12 39 Under that doctrine, if
a judgment had the practical effect of disturbing a non-party's legal
status or property interests, the non-party could challenge the judgment in a separate lawsuit only on limited grounds. The courts of
appeals had almost uniformly applied the doctrine to dismiss separate, post-judgment lawsuits brought by non-minority employees.2 0°
In the courts' view, the judgments affected only the non-minority
employees' expectations of employment or advancement, not their legal rights.
Additionally, many courts were disturbed by the "sit-on-your-"
hands" attitude taken by the non-minorities or groups representing
their interests. Though such groups were often fully aware of the
underlying litigation and the possibility of race/gender-conscious
preferences, they deliberately elected not to intervene in the lawsuit,
and waited for the litigation to conclude before making their objections formally known. For example, in Martin, the underlying litigation was commenced in 1974 by black firefighters against the City of
238. 109 S.Ct. 2180 (1989).
239. E.g., Striff v. Mason, 849 F.2d 240, 243-45 (6th Cir. 1988); Marino v. Ortiz, 806
F.2d 1144, 1146 (2d Cir. 1986), affd by an equally divided Court, 484 U.S. 301 (1988);
Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541, 558 (6th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
240. Although it is not entirely free from doubt, it appears that the courts applied less
restrictive rules to non-minority employees challenging voluntary plans. See supra note 75 and
accompanying text.
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Birmingham, Alabama, alleging violations of Title VII in various
hiring and promotion practices.2 41 After a bench trial, but before
judgment, the parties entered into consent decrees which adopted
race-conscious preferences in promotions. 4 2 The district court held a
fairness hearing at which the Birmingham Firefighters Association
appeared as amicus curiae and filed objections to the plan. The district court rejected its objections and approved the decrees. Subsequently, a group of white firefighters commenced a separate action,
alleging that the promotion preferences called for in the consent decree violated Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause. The district
court denied that motion, conducted a hearing and ultimately dismissed the white firefighters' complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal
of the complaint and ordered a new hearing. The court rejected the
doctrine of impermissible collateral attack.
A majority of the Justices in Martin agreed with the Eleventh
Circuit. In an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court concluded that the doctrine was inconsistent with Rules 19 and 24 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Starting from the well-established premise that "[u]nless duly summoned to appear in a legal
proceeding, a person not a privy may rest assured that a judgment
recovered therein will not affect his legal rights, 2 43 the majority
concluded that the non-minority employees, who had never been formally joined as parties in the underlying Title VII litigation, were
free to attack its validity in a separate action.24 4 The Court supported this conclusion by reference to the mechanisms established in
Rule 19(a) for mandatory joinder, in Rule 19(b) for permissive joinder, and in Rule 24(a) for permissive intervention.246
241.
242.
243.
(1934)).
244.

Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2183.
Id.
Id. at 2185 (quoting Chase Natl Bank v. City of Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431, 441
Id. at 2185-88.

245. Rule 19 provides in pertinent part:
(A) PERSONS TO BE JOINED IF FEASIBLE. A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject

matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in the person's

absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the
person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that
the disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a practical matter
impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the
persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or
otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest. If the person
has not been so joined, the court shall order that the person be made a party. If the
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Linking the holding in Martin to the equal access construct is
not difficult. To begin with, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion in Martin. His rejection of the equal achievement construct has been unwavering. 24 He has championed the equal access
principle in each of the nine cases, from Weber through Johnson,
never departing from. his original view that a race/gender-conscious
preference is "a creator of castes, a two-edged sword that must de1 7
mean one in order to prefer another. 24
Given this perspective, the
Chief Justice's authorship of the majority opinion in Martin takes on
heightened significance. Making it easier for disgruntled employees
to challenge race/gender-conscious preferences will inhibit their
person should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, the person may be made a
defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects
to venue and joinder of that party would render the venue of the action improper,
that party shall be dismissed from the action.
(B) DETERMINATION BY COURT WHENEVER JOINDER NOT FEASIBLE. If a person as
described in subdivision (A)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall
determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among
the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded
as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what
extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to the person or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in
the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be
adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is
dismissed for nonjoinder.
FED. R. Civ. P. 19. Rule 24 provides in pertinent part:
(A) INTERVENTION OF RIGHT. Upon timely applicaton anyone shall be permitted to
intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so
situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is
adequately represented by existing parties.
(B) PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION. Upon timely application anyone may be permitted
to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main
action have a question or law or fact in common. When a party to an action relies
for ground of claim or defense upon any statute or executive order administered by
a federal or state governmental officer or agency or upon any regulation, order,
requirement, or agreement issued or made pursuant to the statute or executive order, the officer or agency upon timely application may be permitted to intervene in
the action. In exercising its discretion the court shall considdr whether the intervention will undely delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original
parties.
FED. R. Crv. P. 24.
246. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
247. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 254 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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adoption. Employers, weary of years of litigating employment discrimination cases, worn out by document requests, interrogatories
and depositions, and exhausted by experts' esoteric analyses, will
have far less incentive to adopt race/gender-conscious preferences,
fearful of a second full round of litigation.
That the Rehnquist Court used Martin to further its rejection
of the equal achievement construct in the 1988 Term is borne out by
Independent Federationof Flight Attendants v. Zipes,4 8 decided ten
days after Martin. Zipes raised the issue of whether a plaintiff in a
Title VII action could recover attorney's fees from an intervenor who
had not violated the statute. Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion in which the Chief Justice joined. Zipes held that attorney fee
awards were permissible only if the intervenor's action was frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation. 24 9 That is the standard earlier
applied by the Court to fee requests by prevailing defendants!2 0 The
Zipes holding clearly sends a signal encouraging non-minority employees to intervene in order to challenge race/gender-conscious
preferences. Justice Scalia's opinion bluntly stated "[a]n intervenor
of the sort before us here is particularly welcome, since we have
stressed the necessity of protecting, in Title VII litigation, 'the legitimate expectations of . . . employees innocent of any wrongdoing.' "251 Zipes gives non-minority employees an incentive to chal-

lenge race/gender-conscious preferences by guaranteeing that if they
are unsuccessful their only monetary loss will be out-of-pocket legal
expenses.2 52 The knowledge that non-minority employees have only
limited losses to bear most certainly will influence employers in deciding whether to sign a consent order containing such relief. It is
also likely to discourage judges from ordering such preferences for
fear of prolonging and complicating the underlying litigation. Martin
delivered the second half of the right-left cross by permitting nonminority employees to challenge an affirmative action plan in independent actions should they choose not to intervene, despite the
Zipes protection.
248. 109 S. Ct. 2732 (1989).
249. Id. at 2735-39.
250. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
251.

Zipes, 109 S. Ct. at 2737-38 (quoting International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United

States, 431 U.S. 324, 372 (1977)).
252.

See, e.g., Davis v. City of San Francisco, 890 F.2d 1438, 1438-52 (9th Cir. 1989),

cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 248 (1990) (denying successful minority plaintiffs' requests for attorney's fees on appeal against union which intervened on behalf of incumbent non-minority employees in Title VII suit).
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Furthermore, in both consent and judicially-imposed judgments,
litigation over race/gender-conscious preferences may delay implementing the remainder of the relief, such as back pay or the establishment of training programs, to the injury of minority employees
and applicants. Martin and Zipes thus discourage plaintiffs' counsel
from seeking such preferences.
Finally, Martin and Zipes signal that the Court is likely to become more aggressive in scrutinizing the effect of race/gender-conscious plans on non-minority employees. It makes no sense for the
Court to create a procedural mechanism for challenging race/gender-conscious preferences, if it does not intend to encourage non-minority employees to use them. 253 Furthermore, while the Court has
never found an employment plan unreasonably burdensome, with the
exception of the one in Wygant, it has always expressed solicitude
for non-minority employees. It would be entirely consistent with the
Rehnquist Court's jurisprudential approach to resolving affirmative
action issues to strike down such plans because of their burdensome
character. It would permit the Court to eviscerate such plans without actually reversing case law.
POWER UNDER SECTION 5
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO MAKE EQUAL
ACHIEVEMENT THE PREFERRED CONSTRUCT OF THE NATION'S
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION POLICIES

V.

CONGRESS SHOULD EXERCISE ITS

The lingering effects of Jim Crowism, inferior schools for minority students, sexism, and skewed vocational training based on
gender stereotypes have contributed significantly to the exclusion of
minorities and women from full participation in the nation's economy. It is highly ironic that while the courts and scholars have debated the meaning of equality and wrestled with the virtues and
vices of the equal access and equal achievement constructs, employers and government contracting officials have seized the initiative by
adopting race/gender-conscious programs throughout the fifty states
and at all levels of the economy.25 The decisions of the 1988 Term
raise considerable doubt as to the continued validity of these efforts.
In light of the need for such programs 255 and their proven success, 256
253. Mann v. City of Albany, 883 F.2d 999 (1lth Cir. 1989).
254. See supra note 72.
255. Measured by almost any standard, the economic gap between non-minorities and
minorities and between men and women is deeply disturbing. For example, in 1988 the unemployment rate for Whites was 4.7%, while the unemployment rate for Blacks and Hispanics
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Congress should statutorily legitimize race/gender-conscious
programs.
There are two advantages to federal statutory intervention. The
first advantage is that the policies adopted by Congress will
represent values selected through the democratic process. As a practical matter, race/gender-conscious preferences have become a fixed
feature of the country's labor policy, adopted regularly by both public and private sector employers. They are also a common feature in
public contracting. They have assumed their place with no input
from Congress. Given the controversial character of such preferences, Congress' avoidance of the issue may be understandable. That
does not make it acceptable. Congress is duty bound to legislate for
the general welfare. 57 It has done so concerning a host of other controversial issues.2 58 An issue of such overriding significance as affirmative action belongs in the halls of Congress. The contours of legislation respecting employment and public contracting rights are fairly
obvious. Congress should strike a balance between the needs of the
nation's minority community and women for accelerated economic
was 11.7% and 8.2%, respectively. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, 113 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 77 (July
1990). In 1988, the median income for White families was $33,915; the median income for
Black and Hispanic families was $19,329 and $21,769 respectively. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1989, at 450, table
727 (109th ed.) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT]. Numerous studies confirm these grim
statistics. E.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, A COMMON DESTINY: BLACK AND AMERICAN
SOCIETY (G. Jaynes & R. Williams eds. 1989) (compiling data and research concerning the
status of blacks in American society since World War II); R. Farley & W. Allen, THE COLOR
LINE AND THE QUALITY OF LIE IN AMERICA (1987) (providing numerous statistics for unemployment rates, personal income, and employment earning by race and sex.).
Women on the average earn only 65% as much as men. N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1988, at
A20, col. 3. In 1986, the median income of full-time female workers was $16,843 while the
median income of full-time male workers was $25,894. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, at 432, Table
711.
256. Numerous studies have documented the effectiveness of race/gender-conscious
plans in opening up high paying jobs to women and minorities in occupations from which they
have traditionally been excluded. H. HAMMERMAN, A DECADE OF NEW OPPORTUNITY: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE 1970's, at 5 (1984); EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION,
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS OF MINORITIES AND WOMEN IN FEDERAL
CONTRACTOR AND NON-CONTRACTOR ESTABLISHMENTS (1984); OFFICE OF FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS OF MINORITIES AND WOMEN IN FEDERAL CONTRACTOR AND NON-CONTRACTOR ESTABLISHMENTS, 1974-1980, at 37 (1984); see
also J. LEONARD, THE IMPACT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1983).
257. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
258. E.g., The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988) (protecting
the right to unionize and imposing a duty of good faith on management and labor with respect
to bargaining); Labor-Mangagement Reporting & Disclosure Act of 1959 (LandrumGriffin
Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1988) (rooting out corruption in unions).
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integration and the expectations of non-minority and male workers
and entrepreneurs.
Overlooking the interests of the latter group would be a serious
mistake. In general, non-minority and male workers and entrepreneurs bear no direct responsibility for the debilitating political and
social conditions which led to labor-force apartheid in major segments of the American economy. While it is true that "innocent"
non-minorities have in the abstract benefitted from the absence of
competition by qualified minority workers and entrepreneurs, that
response is most unlikely to get a sympathetic reception froni nonminorities foreclosed from a job, a promotion, or a public works contract. Abstract truth is cold consolation for dollar deprivation.
Legislating the role of race/gender-conscious preferences in the
work place-has the additional benefit of bestowing a democratic endorsement on the equal achievement construct. While non-minority
and male workers whose employment opportunities may be restricted
as result of the legislation can hardly be expected to embrace such a
statute, it is bound to be more palatable as a policy agreed to during
the legislative give-and-take. Part of the problem with race/genderconscious preferences is the perception that they are being imposed
on non-minority and male workers from "on high" by courts or employers. A national labor policy authorizing their establishment
would go far to dispel this perception.
The second advantage to federal statutory intervention lies in
the development of uniform rules. Such a statute would articulate
guidelines to protect the legitimate expectations of non-minority employees and applicants. For example, it might put a cap or ceiling on
the percentage of promotions or new hires selected by an employer
as a goal for increased minority participation in its work force. The
guidelines might establish criteria for selecting the geographic limits
of the labor pool area to avoid inconsistent choices by similarly situated employers.
Congress should not limit its efforts to amending Title VII.
Congress' intervention should apply to state MBE programs as well
as public employment. As noted earlier, in City of Richmond, the
Court clearly endorsed the equal access doctrine, limiting the states'
decision-making power about how best to spend their funds to promote the common welfare of their citizens.259 The Court's various
holdings lock minorities into the status quo that is the direct result
259. See supra notes 162-71 and accompanying text.
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of near virtual exclusion from skilled craft unions. To correct the
Court's shortsightedness Congressional legislation should address
three areas. First, it should permit set-asides linked to the percentage of minorities and women in the labor pool who possess the qualifications for entry level positions in the public-works construction industry. Second, it should authorize the states to rely on
Congressional studies and federal agency reports in concluding that
state set-asides are needed. Third, it should set percentage guidelines
to ensure that the set-asides are reasonable and do not trammel the
interests of non-minority contractors.
There should be little doubt about Congress' authority to enact
the employment and state-MBE legislation described above. 6 Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress "the power to
enforce . I . by appropriate legislation" the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. 26 1 Despite the considerable
disarray in the nine opinions caused by inconsistent majority, plurality, concurring and dissenting opinions, at least seven Justices acknowledged the sweep of Congress' Section 5 powers in the context
of affirmative action review. A surprising consensus exists between
the Court's conservative and liberal wings. In City of Richmond,
Justice O'Connor joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
White acknowledged the power of Congress to "identify and redress
the effects of society-wide discrimination .. ..- Ironically, they
used the sweep of Congress' Section 5 power in part to justify their
denial of similar authority to the states! Taken at face value their
views in City of Richmond shackle them from aggressive review of
subsequent Section 5 legislation. 63 While Justice Kennedy declined
to join that part of Justice O'Connor's opinion girdling state power,
260. With respect to private employers, Congress originally enacted Title VII by virtue
of its commerce clause power. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 367
concurring in part and dissenting
Blackmum, J.,
(1978) (Brennan, J., White, J., Marshall, J.,
in part); see supra note 54 and accompanying text. That power is checked only by the specific
provisions of the Bill of Rights. In this instance, the equal protection component of the due
process clause is the most obvious check to consider. Arguably, the compatibility of race/
gender-conscious preferences with the equal protection component was resolved affirmatively in
Weber when the Court held that the establishment of voluntary race/gender-conscious preferences was not prohibited by Title VII. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193
(1979).

261. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
262. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490 (1989).
263.

Admittedly, the conservative Justices have several doctrinal escape hatches. To be-

gin with, City of Richmond did not directly involve Congress' Section 5 power. Furthermore,
in Fullilove, which did directly consider the issue, there was no majority opinion. Finally, there
is the rigor of the strict scrutiny test itself. See Gunther, supra note 192.
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he did so because the Fourteenth Amendment "ought not to be interpreted to reduce a State's authority" to remedy discrimination.2 '
Implicitly, his opinion supports a broad reading of Congress' Section
5 authority. Based on their position in Bakke and their dissent in
City of Richmond, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun read
Section 5 broadly.2 5 Questions exist only as to the positions of Justices Scalia and Stevens. In City of Richmond, Justice Scalia cautiously acknowledged Fullilove's deference to Congress' exercise of
Section 5 power, but he did not indicate any affirmative support for
the case.266 Given his staunch opposition to race/gender-conscious
preferences, commitment to the strict scrutiny test, and avowed hostility to extending such preferences to non-victims of discrimination,
17
his support of future Fullilove-like statutes is highly unlikely.26
Justice Stevens' position is more difficult to assess. On the one
hand, he voted with the Court's conservative wing in City of Richmond to strike down the municipal set-aside. 6 8 In that case, as in
Fullilove, he was critical of the alleged remedial character of the
City's MBE program and the selection of the program's beneficiaries.'"69 On the other hand, he also reaffirmed his alliance with the
Court's liberal wing in City of Richmond. In that case, as in Wygant
and Fullilove, Justice Stevens disavowed "sin" or the culpability cri264. City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 518 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the
judgment).
265. See id. at 557 ("[Section] 5 'is a positive grarit of legislative power authorizing
Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to
secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.' ") (emphasis in original) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966)); see also Regents of
the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 368 (1978) (stating that "[t]o the extent that
Congress acted pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment [our] cases impliedly recognize
that Congress was empowered under that provision to accord preferential treatment to victims
of past discrimination in order to overcome the effects of segregation ....")(Brennan, J.,
White, J., Marshall, J. Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun did not address the issue of Congress' Section 5 power in Fullilove. They instead advocated the use of the intermediate test rather than the strict scrutiny to
review legislation which benefited minorities. See Fullilove v. Kluznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519
(1980) (stating that "the proper inquiry is whether racial classifications designed to further
remedial purposes serve important governmental objectives and are substantially related to
achievement of those objectives"). Given the strength of the views they expressed in Bakke,
their failure to address the Section 5 issue in Fullilove is inconsequential.
266. City of Richmond, 488 U.S. 521-22 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
267. E.g., id. at 738; Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 657-77 .(1987)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); see Scalia, The Disease as Cure: "In Order to Get Beyond Racism, We
Must First Take Account of Race," 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 147.
268. City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 511-17 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and in the
judgment).
269. Id.; Fullilove v. Kluznick, 448 U.S. 448, 532-54 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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terion discussed earlier 270 and endorsed the right of employers and
public contracting officials to adopt race/gender-conscious preferences for forward-looking reasons. Such reasons include the intangible benefits flowing from an integrated faculty, the provision of better services to minority citizens, the prevention of racial tension, and
the elimination of racial caste systems. 71
In light of Katzenbach v. Morgan,7 2 it is not surprising that
seven Justices, liberal and conservative alike, acknowledged Congress' sweeping Section 5 power regarding affirmative action. The
Katzenbach plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of Section 4(e)
of the Voting Rights Act of 1964 enacted pursuant to Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 78 Congress adopted Section 4(e) in response to a New York State statute which had effectively disenfranchised the State's Puerto Rican residents through the imposition
of an English language literacy test.274 The statute affirmatively ordered the states to permit any citizen to vote who possessed a sixthgrade education from a public school under the jurisdiction of the
United States, including Puerto Rico. 5
What made Katzenbach a particularly difficult case was an earlier decision of the Court in Lassiter v. Northhampton County
Board of Elections,2 7 upholding a North Carolina literacy require-

ment similar to New York's. Katzenbach raised the formidable issue
of Congress' authority to outlaw a practice the Court had previously
held constitutional. 7 By drawing a powerful analogy to the Necessary and Proper Clause,27 8 the Court concluded Section 5 did not
270. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
271. See City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 511-13 nn.1-2 (Stevens, J., corcurring in part
and in the judgment); Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 646-47 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 314-18 (1986) (Stevens,

J., dissenting).
272.

384 U.S. 641 (1966).

273. Id. at 643.
274. Id. at 645 n.l.
275. Id. at 643.
276.

360 U.S. 45 (1959).

277. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 646-47.
278. If the Court sticks to .the view that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
intended to give Congress "the same broad powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper
Clause," id. at 650, imagining the limits of the power strains constitutional ideation. Congress'
power under The Necessary and Proper Clause is virtually unbounded. See McCulloch v. Ma-

ryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 319 (1819). The Bill of Rights guarantees are its only check.
Using the guarantee of "equal protection" in the Fifth Amendment to strike down legislation
designed to integrate minorities into American society would be an exercise of raw judicial
power, especially if, as this Article suggests, Congress carefully crafts the statute to diffuse any
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"confine the legislative power... to the insignificant role of abrogating only those state laws that the judicial branch was prepared to
adjudge unconstitutional, or of merely informing the judgment of the
judiciary by particularizing the 'majestic generalities' of § 1 of the
Amendment. 2719 The Court went on to conclude that it need only
"perceive a basis upon which the Cofigress might resolve the conflict
as it did. 28 ° Certainly the abundant evidence of the economic disparity which exists between whites and blacks, men and women, as
well as the success of race/gender-conscious programs, provides a
28
basis for the Congressional enactment proposed herein. 1
Katzenbach, logically leads to the question of what constitutional authority, if any, would cabin Congress in authorizing the
states to implement MBE programs and race/gender-conscious preferences in employment.28 2 The "one way ratchet theory" of Section
5 views the equal protection guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments as a restraint on Congress' power. It relies on express
language in Katzenbach, affirmatively denying the proposition that
Congress could invoke Section 5 to dilute equal protection guarantees. Fullilove, however, sets to rest any doubts about the applicability of the one-way ratchet theory. In Fullilove, six Justices discounted a similar argument directed to Congress' power under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Fullilove, supported by Bakke and City of Richmond, places the fate of race/
gender-conscious preferences in state MBE programs and employment decisions in Congress' hands. Congress clearly has the power
under Section 5 to enact the statute called for in this Article. 8
burden among "innocent" non-minorities and to protect their legitimate entitlement.
279. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 648-49. The Katzenbach Court also found support for its
broad view of Congress' power in decisions construing the analogous enforcement provision of
the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. at 651. Between Katzenbach and City of Richmond several
decisions revisited the issue of Congress' Section 5 power, but their jurisprudence is obscure.
E.g., EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 259-64 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Mississippi
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 732-33 (1983).
280. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 652.
281. See supra notes 255-56.
282. See generally Cohen, Congressional Power to Validate Unconstitutional State
Laws: A ForgottenSolution to an Old Enigma, 35 STAN. L. REv. 387, 388 (1983) (advocating
the premise that "Congress should be able to approve unconstitutional policy choices in state
laws when Congress is not contitutionally prohibited from directly adopting the same policy
itself."); Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27
STAN. L. REv. 603, 614 (1975) (arguing that congressional decisions are not entitled to any
more deference than state legislative decisions which reject judicial interpretations of the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses).
283. Several scholars have commented favorably on Congress' power to create substan-
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VI.

CONCLUSION

Under the leadership of Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court
brought some order to its affirmative action jurisprudence. For the
time being, in the Bickel/Ely, Harlan/Blackmun debate on the
meaning of equality2 ' the Court has declared the proponents of the
equal access construct the winner. In taking such a sharp turn to the
right, however, the Court has dead-ended the economic progress of
minorities and women. Race/gender-conscious programs make sense
because they foster progress. Until such time as the powerful, lingering effects of racism, Jim Crowism, and sexism dissipate, such programs are needed to counteract the public and private, individual
and institutional biases whose synergy operates on a daily basis to
deny minorities and women equal access to employment and entrepreneurial opportunities. Equal achievement paves the way for
equal access. Equal achievement strengthens the hobbled runners,
enabling them to compete without catch-up points in future races.
There is no constitutional need for the Court to be the sole drafter of
the rules governing the race. The drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment in Section 5 specifically entrusted the eradication of inequality
to Congress.285 Congress should live up to that responsibility by
crafting legislation balancing the needs and expectations of all the
runners in the race for economic security and advancement.. It
should straighten out the turn taken by the Rehnquist Court and
pave a path between equal access and equal achievement.

tive rights under Section 5. See, e.g., Cox, The Role of Congress in ConstitutionalDeterminations, 40 U. CIN. L. REv. 199 (1971); Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REv. 91 (1966);
Sager, FairMeasure: The Legal Status of Underenforced ConstitutionalNorms, 91 HARv. L.

REv. 1212 (1978).
284.

See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.

285. See supra notes 260-62 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX
Equal
Equal
Access Achievement
Case
Comment
The striking down of the exclux
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. X
sive reservation of 16 seats for
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
minorities is an endorsement of
(equal protection clause claim
the equal access construct; the
brought by a rejected white
approval of race as a "plus" is
applicant challenging a special
an endorsement of the equal
admissions program to a state
achievement construct.
medical school which reserved
16 out of 100 seats exclusively
for minority applicants).
United Steelworkers v. Weber,
x
The Court's approval of the
443 U.S. 193 (1979) (Title
setting-aside of trainee slots
based on race is an endorseVII claim brought by a white
employee challenging the imment of the equal achievement
construct. Supporting this
plementation by a private seccharacterization is the Court's
tor employer of a training prorefusal to condition the selecgram, admission to which was
tion of the black trainees on
determined by the applicant's
proof of actual victimization
race).
by the employer and its choice
of a sweeping statistical baseline to measure the racial composition of the employer's work
force. See supra notes 79-81
and accompanying text.
The Court's approval of the
x
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448 (1980) (Equal Pro10% MBE set-aside is an endorsement of the equal
tection Clause claim brought
by white contactors chalenging
achievement construct. Supporting this characterization
a provision of the Public
Works Employment Act of
are: the Court's quick, unquestioning approval of Congress's
1977 which set aside 10% of
selection of the 10% figure, its
the funds appropriated pursuant to the statute for minority
relaxed, almost nonexistent, requirement of government rebusiness enterprises).
sponsibility for the low participation of minority business
enterprises in public contracting, and its casual discussion of whether the participating minority business
enterprises had to be actual
victims of discrimination by
the government. See supra
notes 153-61 and accompanying text.
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Equal
Equal
Comment
Access Achievement
Case
By restricting the district
Firefighters Local Union No. x
court's authority to modify a
1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561
consent judgment to protect
(Title VII claim
(1984)
newly hired minority firefightbrought by a union objecting
ers, the Court gave greater
to a district court order modiweight to the equal access confying a consent judgment to
struct (i.e., minority and nonprevent the lay-off of recently
minority firefighters were behired miniority firefighters).
ing treated in the same fashion). It refused to allow the
district court to give minorities
"catch-up" points to which
would have had the effect of
recognizing how long the city
had excluded them from access
to these jobs. Its refusal constituted a rejection of the equal
achievement construct. Furthermore, the Court's opinion
contained dicta suggesting that
Title VII relief was limited to
actual victims of discrimination. This dicta clearly manifested an endorsement of the
equal access construct. Note,
however, that a majority of the
Justices disavowed the Stotts
dicta in Local 28 of Sheet
Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v.
EEOC, 478 U.S. at 471-75
(4-Justice plurality
(1986)
opinion); id. at 484 (Powell, J.,
concurring opinion); id. at 499
(White, J., dissenting).
The Court's disapproval of a
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
layoff provision designed to reEduc., 476 U.S. 267 (1986)
tain newly hired minority
Clause
Protection
(Equal
teachers reflects an endorseclaim brought by non-minority
ment of the equal access conschool teachers challenging a
struct. Supporting this characmodified lay-off procedure
terization are: the opinion's
which retained minority teachrejection of remediation of soers with less seniority at the
cietal discrimination and the
expense of non-minority teachrole-model justification for
ers with greater seniority).
race/gender-conscious preferences; and its refusal to remand the case for factual clarification in light of the
unseemingly state of the record.
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Equal
Equal
Comment
Access Achievement
Case
x
The Court's opinion displayed
Local 28 of Sheet Metal x
a decided preference for the
Workers' Int'l Ass'n of EEOC,
equal achievement construct
478 U.S. 421 (1986) (Title
(1) by permitting the district
VII claim brought by non-micourt to order preferential renority union members to set
lief for individuals who were
aside a judicially-mandated
not specifically the object of
29% membership goal which
the union's discriminatory
the district court imposed folpractices; and (2) by refusing
lowing a finding of egregious
to consider the union's claim
discrimination.
that the district court's selection of a 29% minority-membership goal far exceeded the
precentage of minorities in the
relevant labor force. Tempering this preference is the
Court's emphasis on the egregious character of the defendant's refusal to observe the
strictures of Title VII and its
contumacy in face of repeated
court orders to cease its discriminatory practices. The
Court appears to be endorsing
the equal achievement construct as a last resort, when all
else fails to achieve equal access.

x

Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n
of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986) (Title VII claim brought by nonminority firefighters challenging a consent judgment signed
by the city and a black
firefighters association, which
called for promotion quotas).

United States v. Paradise, 480
U.S. 149 (1987) (Equal Protection Clause claim brought
by non-minority state troopers
to upset a judicially-mandated
50/50 promotion plan, which
the district court imposed fol-

x

x

In holding that § 706(g) did
not apply to consent judgments, the Court endorsed the
equal achievement construct
by allowing employers to use
preferences
race-conscious
without fear of challenge
under that provision. In addition, it used City of Cleveland
as a vehicle for retreating from
the sweeping equal access language it used in Stotts.
The Court's approval of a
one-for-one
race-conscious,
promotion quota reflects the
equal achievement construct.
At the same time, its repeated
insistence on the outrageous
character of defendant's be-
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Case
Access Achievement
Comment
lowing a finding of egregious
havior and the qualifications of
discrimination).
the minority troopers benefitted by the quota reflect values
consistent with the equal access construct.
Johnson v. Transportation
x
The Court's approval of an imAgency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987)
mutable characteristic (sex) as
(Title VII claim brought by a
a "plus" is an endorsement of
male whose supervisor denied
the equal achievement conhim a promotion, selecting an
struct, as is the Court's selecarguably less qualified wotion of general population staman).
tistics to measure the
discriminatory impact of the
employer's personnel decisions.
See supra notes 127-39 and
accompanying text.
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